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I. RESPONSE TO TOOELE CITY'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF RE VIEW. 
In its Brief of Appellant ("TA's Brief), TA set forth "Issue No. 1" as follows: 
"[m]ay the Jury's Verdict be read harmoniously, mandating the entry of a judgment that 
effectuates the Jury's mixed findings of fact and law and overall intent?" TA's Brief at 1 
The City argues that TA is wrong in its assertion that "no Utah appellate court appears to 
have directly addressed the standard of review to be employed." City's Brief at 1. In 
support of its argument, the City cites Rasmussen v. Sharpata, 895 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct 
App. 1995) and other cases1 holding that the "abuse of discretion standard applies to the 
review of a trial court's disposition of a motion for a new trial predicated on 
inconsistency in the jury's special verdict." Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added). 
In this case, neither party filed a motion for a new trial nor did the Trial Court 
make a discretionary determination upon any such motion. Rather, the issue is whether 
the Trial Court properly found the Jury's Verdict to be irreconcilably inconsistent as a 
matter of law, leaving it no other choice but to order a new trial. That issue has not been 
1
 Rasmussen, Wellman v. Noble, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961), Markham v. Bradley, 2007 
UT App 379, 173 P.3d 865, and Bonin v. Tour West, Inc., 896 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1990) 
are distinguishable from this case as each involved the review of a trial court's exercise 
of discretion pertaining to a motion for a new trial filed by a party. Further, Wellman was 
overruled by Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Utah 1993). Both Smith v. Riceland 
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1998) and Richard 'v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 853 F.2d 1258,1260 (5th Cir. 1988) involved the issue of whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in sending the jury back for further deliberations after concluding 
that the jury's answers were unclear or confusing, which is not an issue in this case. See 
City's Brief at 2. 
l Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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directly addressed by Utah appellate courts. Other courts addressing this issue have 
applied de novo review. See TA's Brief at 1, n.l. 
The City further argues that when harmonizing a jury's verdict it is appropriate to 
consider the verdict from the jury's perspective. City's Brief at 2 (quoting TA's Brief at 
44). While TA agrees with this principle, it is completely unrelated to the issue of which 
standard of review is to be applied to the legal determination made by the Trial Court sua 
sponte. 
The City did not contradict the standards of review that TA set forth for Issues No. 
2 and 3, which are, therefore, presumably correct. 
II. RESPONSE TO TOOELE CITY'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts in the City's Brief demonstrate 
that the City has convinced itself that it won this case at trial. If the facts presented at 
trial were as portrayed by the City, the Jury could not and would not have returned the 
findings that were highly favorable to TA, and could not nor would not have determined 
that the City caused $22.5 million in damages to TA due to the City's wrongful actions. 
[R. 22161-68]. 
The City's Brief contains numerous misleading or incorrect representations of 
"facts." The City has further made citation to pages of the record that simply do not 
exist, and has otherwise prevented the reasonable identification of supporting material by, 
for example, citing over three-hundred seventy consecutive pages in support of an 
2 
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allegation.2 Due to page limitations, TA will spare the Court from a detailed discussion 
of each of the City's inaccurate representations and focus only on a few of the most 
relevant topics. Other relevant misrepresentations will be addressed directly in TA's 
Argument. TA addi esses additional inaccuracies in Addendum "A" attached hereto. 
A. The City's claim that TA blocked a Jury Instruction that the City is entitled to 
deny future phases under the Bond Agreements and that TA is precluded from 
receiving a damage award is misleading. 
The City alleges that TA prevented the City from admitting a proposed Jury 
Instruction on the City's "important" "trial strategy" that the City may deny future phases 
and thus preclude TA from recovering damages under the Bond Agreements.3 See City's 
Brief at 5, 7, 52 n. 36. The proposed instruction that the City appears to be referencing 
was titled "Stipulated or Otherwise Established Facts." [R. 24341, pp. 2671-75; R. 
22097-105]. It consisted of 9 pages and 61 paragraphs of what the City claimed were 
"stipulated facts." Id. The Trial Court correctly determined that many of the "stipulated 
facts" proposed by the City had not been "stipulated" to as the title suggested. Id. One of 
the 61 paragraphs of purported "stipulated facts" was the City's incomplete paraphrasing 
2
 Examples include City's Brief at 16, 17 and 57 citing, respectively, R. 24337, p. 320; R. 
24340, pp. 2013-14 and 2035; and R. 24334, pp. 41, 143-44 and R. 24335, pp. 201-02. 
At 21 the City's Brief purports to cite 372 consecutive pages in support of an allegation 
(R. 24334 pp. 528-901) but Record pages R. 24334, pp. 709-901 do not exist. 
The City did not raise this Jury Instruction claim in its Cross-Petition to Appeal 
Interlocutory Order, therefore, the issue is not properly before the Court on this appeal. 
Houghton v. Dep yt of Health, 2005 UT 63, ^  16, 125 P.3d 860, 865 ("[o]n interlocutory 
appeal, only those specific issues presented in the petition and cross-petition will be 
reviewed."). 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the Trial Court's prior determination that the Bond Agreements permitted the City to 
deny future phases, subject to a later determination of waiver by the Jury. [R. 22104]. 
The City argued that the proposed instruction should be given because the City 
had not put on evidence at trial of "facts" which it believed had been judicially admitted 
and would have been set forth in the instruction. [R. 22341, p. 2672]. The Trial Court 
wasn't convinced of the need for the instruction as it was presented. [R. 22341, pp. 2674-
75]. The Trial Court further concluded that all parties had notice before the trial started 
that there were disputes as to which previous rulings and admission could and could not 
be used in the trial proceedings. Id. Therefore, the Court decided to give an instruction 
referencing only those "stipulated facts" that were, in fact, "stipulated" to by both parties; 
i.e., the eight facts that are in Jury Instruction No. 17. [R. 22190-91]. 
The City did not request a standalone instruction to the Jury regarding the alleged 
consequences of finding a breach of the Bond Agreements (i.e., that the City claimed TA 
could not recover any damages caused by the City). Neither did the City request a Jury 
Instruction that the Bond Agreements permitted the City to deny future development if 
the Jury found that TA had (materially) breached4 the Bond Agreements and that the 
breach had not been waived. Further, the City did not attempt to introduce testimony or 
evidence regarding its interpretation of the Trial Court's previous ruling on the Bond 
4
 Pursuant to the City's argument that it preserved whatever claims it had asserted in the 
Pre-trial Order, the City would only have preserved a claim of material breach of the 
Bond Agreements against TA. [R. 21915]. 
4 
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Agreement,5 even though testimony concerning other previous rulings in favor of the 
City was presented to the Jury. [R. 24336, p. 1035]6. In fact, the City seemed to avoid 
expressly revealing its theory on the Bond Agreements to the Jury through testimony,7 
o 
instructions, or even Verdict questions. 
In sum, the City failed to put on evidence crucial to support its current theory of 
the case; i.e., that Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement prevents TA from recovering any 
damages at all. The City further failed to submit a Jury Instruction on application of the 
Bond Agreement in any way other than its attempt to enter a massive "stipulated facts" 
instruction that was not stipulated to by the parties. The City's failure to present its case 
to the Jury is the result of the City's own trial strategy and cannot be blamed on TA. 
B. The City's claim that "no one" believed the City's actions indicated 
acceptance of public improvements is false and unsupported. 
5
 City's Brief at 38 ("the applicability of the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new 
phases based upon incomplete improvements was not before the jury.") 
6
 A key pre-trial ruling of the Trial Court that the Development Agreement had not been 
properly assigned from TA to others without prior consent of the City came into evidence 
through questioning and testimony of TA's witnesses. 
n 
When the City Attorney was asked about remedies for breach of the Bond Agreements, 
he was only asked whether the Bond Agreement had remedies related to the denial of 
"future permits or licenses," to which he simply responded, "yes it does," without any 
expansion or explanation of the "death penalty" argument the City now makes. [R. 
24339, pp. 1941-43]." 
In contrast to the City's very detailed questions in the Verdict regarding breach of the 
Development Agreement (which reference each specific section of the Agreement the 
City alleges was breached), the Verdict and the Jury Instructions are completely void of 
any reference to Paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreements. [R. 22161-68]. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The City acknowledges that it approved additional Overlake subdivision plats and 
issued building occupancy permits in phases before all public improvements in previous 
phases were complete, and further had made "municipal services available" to the 
allegedly incomplete areas.9 City's Brief at 12. However, on the same page the City 
claims that "no one" believed that such actions "indicated TA's public improvements 
were complete or somehow relieved TA from properly finishing them." While the City 
inspector, engineer and attorney testified that they did not believe that the City indicated 
that the City improvements were complete, certainly, TA did not share this belief, and the 
record pages cited by the City do not demonstrate that TA shared this belief10 
C. The Jury Instructions support the Jury's finding of waiver by the City. 
9
 The City's position is also belied by the fact that the City allowed other subdivisions to 
connect to some of these facilities and swore to the State of Utah that the facilities were 
complete for receiving road tax funds. [R. 24340, pp. 2249-52, 2314]. 
10
 The City cites testimony from the City's agents or witnesses (Cary Campbell, Gerald 
Webster and Paul Hirst) as to their understanding of City policy or staff actions/practices 
not specifically applied to TA. City's Brief at 12 [citing R. 24335, pp. 800-01; 24339 pp. 
2025-26; 24340, pp. 2298-99]. The City also includes citations to the testimony of Drew 
Hall and Paul Edwards, neither of whom testified that TA knew or understood that the 
City's actions did not indicate that "TA's public improvements were complete or 
somehow relieved TA from properly finishing them." See R. 24333, p. 288 (Mr. Hall 
testifying that despite the City's claim that Phase IB is incomplete the City granted 
Certificates of Occupancy for houses in IB, that plats were approved after IB, and that 
houses were built in IB before all of the improvements were complete); R. 24335, pp. 
775-76 (Mr. Edwards testifying to his understanding that a street had to be deemed 
complete in order for lots abutting the street to be developed). 
6 
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The City alleges and argues that regardless of what any City agent did to 
communicate acceptance of improvements or purportedly "waive" certain requirements 
of the Bond Agreements or Development Agreement, that such agents were not 
authorized to do so. City's Brief at 11, 13, n. 12, 14, n. 13. To the contrary, the Jury was 
specifically instructed that City employee or officials were capable of waiving "the City's 
known rights, benefits or advantages" by their actions. [R. 22254, Jury Instr. No. 54]. 
The City contends that the Jury was instructed that only the City Council had the 
authority to "do what Mr. Webster purported to - accept public improvements." City's 
Brief at 14, n. 13. However, the Jury was also instructed that City Code provides that 
upon "verification by the City Engineer or Public Works Director that all public 
improvements have been satisfactorily completed in accordance with the approved 
engineering plans and specifications[,] [t]he City Council will approve a resolution 
accepting the public improvements . . . " [R. 22224 (emphasis added)]. The City Engineer 
executed/accepted such verifications in regard to Phases 1A-1B, the City Inspector issued 
reports certifying that the City deemed the Phases 1A- 1C improvements complete, and 
the City Attorney represented that the City accepted the improvements in Phases 1A-1C 
as complete. [Exs. 25, 114, 123, 124, 138, 140]. 
The Jury clearly determined that the City acted wrongfully and in material breach 
of the Development Agreement and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing "by 
refusing to recognize and accept its own admission that public improvements within the 
Overlake Project Area's subdivisions were complete. [R. 22163, Quest. No. l.g]. This 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
finding, supported by an abundance of evidence, supports the Jury's finding of waiver of 
material breaches related to public improvements. [R. 22165, Quest. No. 3]. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE CITY'S THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE VERDICT MUST BE 
REJECTED. 
The City acknowledges that harmonization does not involve the subtraction or 
addition of language. City's Brief at 29. But the City's theory for interpreting the 
Verdict violates that rule, as it requires the Court to both omit and add or alter language11 
in the Verdict, and, further, is contrary to the Jury's clear intent and mixed findings of 
law and fact. Unlike TA's interpretation of the Verdict, the City's theory of 
interpretation does not permit the co-existence of Questions 3 and 8 as they are drafted. 
City's Brief at 28-29, 33-35, 47. Rather, the City's theory requires that Question 8 trump 
Question 3 (and that language in Question 3 be ignored and language altered in Question 
8). This is inconsistent with the Jury's factual findings and would require that the Court 
essentially disregard approximately two-thirds of the Verdict. 
According to the City, if this Court is not willing to interpret a few choice snippets 
of the Verdict by adding and deleting language in the manner suggested by the City, then 
the case must be retried. City's Brief at 23, 54. Of course the City wants the case retried 
11
 The City's interpretation requires changing the language of Question 8 - which on its 
face is silent as to "breach"- from waiver of the City's "right to claim that [TA] did not 
complete the public improvement in Overlake" to "waiver of breach'" City's Brief at 47 
(arguing without citation to authority, "[w]aiving 'rights to claim' means waiving, inter 
alia, a claim of breach.") 
8 
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- the City lost at trial and wants a "do-over." However, the Verdict can be harmonized 
under TA's interpretation, and retrial is unnecessary. 
1. The Trial Court's reasoning in its Order denying the City's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment is not the "law of the case," and its application 
is dependent on the Jury's findings of fact. 
The City argues that it is entitled to judgment in its favor due to "the law of the 
case that 'the Bond Agreements do, indeed, vest authority in the City to deny further 
phases based upon incomplete public improvements.'" City's Brief at 24, 38, 40-41. The 
City repeatedly refers to its right or ability to invoke the purported "law of the case" post-
trial to eliminate TA's $22.5 million damage award. Id. The City clearly ignores the 
finality requirements of the "law of the case" doctrine: "it requires a final judgment to 
sustain the application of the rule of the law of the case just as it does for the kindred rule 
of res judicata. And although the latter is a uniform rule, the 'law of the case' is only a 
discretionary rule of practice." U.S. v. U.S. Smelting Refining & Min. Co., 339 U.S. 186 
(1950) (internal citations omitted); see also U.S. v. Phillips, 59 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1187 (D. 
Utah 1999). Utah law recognizes that the "law of the case" doctrine requires a final 
determination, and that prior to such finality a trial court has discretion to amend its 
ruling.13 
"[T]he doctrine is synonymous with final judgment. The preclusive effect of the iaw 
of the case' only applies if there was a final judgment that decided that issue." 
13
 Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final order) (quoting Richardson v. 
Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) "generally preliminary or interim 
rulings do not rise to the dignity ofres judicata or stare decisis.")', Mid-America Pipeline 
Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, fflf 11-12, 216 P.3d 352 ("Thus the doctrine of law of 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In this case, the City relies on language of the Trial Court explaining why it denied 
the City's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on All Claims Regarding Denial of 
New Phase Due to Incomplete Public Improvements"14 as "the law of the case." City's 
Brief at 5, 7-8, 23-24 (citing R. 14351). The language was not part of a final judgment, 
order or ruling. Rather, the Trial Court expressly held that its conclusion was subject to a 
subsequent determination by the Jury as to whether the City waived its Bond Agreement 
right to deny further phases because TA had set forth sufficient evidence to support a 
finding of waiver by the Jury. [R. 14359, 14362 (further citing a major dispute over the 
City's "various admissions" and "inconsistent actions")]. 
the case tracks with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that prior to final 
judgment, 'any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates 
fewer than all the claims ... is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.'"). 
14
 Even if the Trial Court had granted the City's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
upon finding that as a matter of law the Bond Agreements authorized the City to deny 
new phases based on any hyper-technical "non-completion" of the public improvements, 
such ruling would not bind this Court, as this Court would review the decision for 
correctness, giving no deference to the Trial Court's decision. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, 
ffi[15-17 (April 1, 2011). Further, even though it was not a final order, the Trial Court 
was wrong. The Bond Agreements provide the City with the right to deny future plats 
based on incomplete improvements in prior plats on only a temporary basis because the 
Bond Agreement provided for a built in "cure" upon completion of improvements, 
payment of fees or calling of the bond. [Ex. 220 ^ 17, 18]. Clearly, the irreversible 
application of the "death penalty" to the entire Overlake development is not the purpose 
of, or the remedy contemplated by, the Bond Agreements. [Id. Tflf 2, 17,18]. 
10 
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Contrary to the City's characterization of the statement, the Trial Court expressly 
avoided making a final determination on the issue.15 Thus, the statement is not "the law 
of the case." The City further argues that the "Jury had no authority to 'reject' the iaw 
of the case."5 City's Brief at 51-52. In fact, the Trial Court's ruling was that the Jury 
was required to make mixed findings of fact and law (such as findings related to waiver 
and substantial performance)16 which would in effect eliminate or "reject" the City's 
claim or defense that the Bond Agreements vest the City with authority to deny further 
phases based on incomplete public improvements. [R. 14359]. 
If the Trial Court had actually ruled that as a matter of law the Bond Agreement 
authorized the City to deny further phases based solely on any hyper-technical "non-
completion" of public improvements, the Trial Court would have entered summary 
judgment in the City's favor and spared the parties (and the Trial Court) from a three 
week long jury trial. 
This is not the first time that the City's has misinterpreted the language in the Court's 
August 13, 2008 Ruling. The Trial Court previously noted: 
Citing the Court's August 13, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order, defendants 
next argue that the Court should exclude evidence and argument regarding 
substantial performance of the Bond Agreements because the Court has already 
determined, as a matter of law, that TA did not substantially comply with the Bond 
Agreements. The Court disagrees. The Court's prior ruling did not hold as a 
matter of law that TA failed to substantially perform its obligations under the 
Bond Agreements. Rather, the Court concluded that this is an issue to be resolved 
by the fact-finder at trial [R. 20834 (emphasis added)]. 
16
 R. 20834. 
17 
The Trial Court found that "there is no question that" certain improvements were not 
completed. Had this been enough for the Court to rule that the City was entitled to deny 
further phases as a matter of law, undoubtedly such ruling would have been made and the 
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The City argues that case law, specifically focusing on Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 
UT App 209, Tf 30, 47 P.3d 76,18 should be applied to this case such that "if the SVF 
findings support, as a matter of law, the City's Bond Agreement right to deny new 
phases, then the City could not have been required to approve new phases." City's Brief 
at 39. As determined by the Trial Court, application of Paragraph 18 of the Bond 
Agreement was dependent on the Jury's resolution of the factual issues of waiver and 
substantial performance - which the Jury resolved in favor of TA. [R. 14351; 20834; 
case disposed of. [See also R. 23295, p. 40 (The City points out that the Trial Court 
"already knew there were incomplete improvements . . . [and] already knew about 
paragraph 18 of the Bond Agreement" when it denied partial summary judgment)]. 
I O 
Dishinger is distinguishable because all legal theories were presented to the Jury at 
trial. Based on the jury's factual findings, the court chose between two inconsistent legal 
theories as a matter of law. In this case, the issue is whether a legal theory that was 
hidden from the Jury can void the Jury's mixed findings of facts and law. Similarly, the 
City cites several other cases in support of its argument which are not on point. City's 
Brief at 40. The issue in Judd ex rel Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 103 P.3d 135 
was whether the damages cap (a purely legal issue not subject to doctrines of waiver or 
substantial performance) was constitutional, not whether the cap should have been 
disclosed to the jury. In Milligan v. Capitol Furn. Co., 355 P.2d 619, 622 (Utah 1959) 
the plaintiffs contributory negligence was deemed the proximate cause of his injuries by 
the Court as a matter of law because there were no facts to suggest otherwise, even 
though there was no jury finding on proximate causation (therefore, the Court's finding 
on the issue as a matter of law was not contrary to factual findings of the jury). In 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass % 470 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah 1970) the jury found the 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that both plaintiff and defendant proximately 
caused Plaintiffs injury, therefore, the Court's application of the law that Plaintiff could 
not recover was consistent with the jury's findings, unlike this case in which the City 
proposes the Court go against the factual findings of the Jury. 
12 
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22162-65]. Accordingly, the City cannot win on this issue as a "matter of law" when the 
Jury's factual findings in the Verdict are contrary to the City's position.19 
2. The Jury was not provided a basis upon which to distinguish between the 
public improvement requirements of the Bond Agreements and the 
Development Agreement. 
The Bond Agreements are subsumed by the Development Agreement and the two 
agreements must be considered together. The sole purpose of Bond Agreements is to 
secure performance of the public improvements obligation for each Overtake phase 
approved under the Development Agreement. [R. 22222, City Code § 7-19-12 (4)]. The 
Development Agreement provides that TA was required to construct public 
improvements that comply with all City requirements, including the approved 
subdivision plats and plans. [Ex. 100 §§ VI.2.E, VII.2.E, VIII.2.A, XVII]. The City 
Code required TA to execute the Bond Agreements in order to perform under the 
Development Agreement, and compliance with such "ordinances, resolutions, policies 
Clearly, the Jury found that TA was entitled to continue developing Overlake. [R. 
22162-63]. That factual finding cannot be reconciled with the City's argument that it 
may invoke the "death penalty" of the Development Agreement after trial. Specifically, 
the Jury found that the City was required to extend the term of the Development 
Agreement, which by definition could only occur if the Jury found that TA had 
"substantially complied" with or "substantially performed" the terms of the agreement 
(including public improvement requirements). Id. The Jury also found that the City had 
wrongfully refused to approve, and threatened refusal of, applications for the creation of 
new subdivisions within Overlake. Id. Further, the Jury's finding of waiver in Question 
3 is supported by its factual finding that the City wrongfully refused to recognize and 
accept its own admissions that public improvements within Overlake were complete, by 
slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the public improvements constructed by 
TA in Overlake, and by misinterpreting and misapplying its own public improvement 
ordinances in relation to Overlake. [R. 22162-65]. 
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and procedures of the City" is an incorporated term of the Development Agreement. [Ex. 
100 § XVII; R. 2222220]. Like the Development Agreement, the Bond Agreements 
incorporate the requirements of the approved subdivisions plats and plans.21 
The City argues, "[considering the evidence and the instructions, the jury might 
have concluded that TA's Bond Agreement duties predated, and were more onerous than 
TA's Development Agreement duties, and that the City waived the Development 
Agreement's public improvements duties, but not the Bond Agreement's duties." City's 
Brief at 42 (emphasis added). This argument was not presented to the Jury. The City 
further argues that it was more difficult for TA to prove waiver of a Bond Agreement 
duty than a Development Agreement duty - even though this theory was never explained 
or presented to the Jury. See City's Brief at 43. The City cites to the language of the 
Bond Agreements and the Development Agreement to support these arguments but the 
City does not, and cannot, cite to a single page of the Record where the City explained or 
asked the Jury to be instructed that the public improvement requirements of the two 
agreements were different, that TA's failure to complete the improvements was a breach 
"Within ninety (90) days of final plat approval, the subdivider shall submit and execute 
a bond and bond agreement compliant with this Section ... failure [to do so] shall result 
in the automatic revocation of, and shall void, the final plat approval." 
21
 The City falsely implies that TA argued the Bond Agreements do not incorporate the 
approved plans and plats. City's Brief at 43. TA actually argued that the Jury found that 
the City materially breached the Development Agreement and acted in bad faith when it 
made it impossible for TA to complete the public improvements by wrongfully "hiding 
the ball" and holding TA to standards above and beyond what was required by the 
Development Agreement, Bond Agreements, the plans and plats or any City Ordinance. 
TA's Brief at 28-29; [R. 22463]. 
14 
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of the Bond Agreements even if the Jury determined it was not a breach of the 
Development Agreement,22 or that the agreements had a different standard for waiver. 
See City's Brief at 41-45.23 
To the contrary, as noted by the Trial Court, the City failed to distinguish breach 
of the Development Agreement based on the failure to complete public improvement 
from breach of the Bond Agreements based on the failure to complete public 
improvements at trial. [See R. 24306 (the Trial Court concluding "to reach the 
conclusion that the jury made a distinction between the two when it comes to the 
11
 [R. 22201, Jury Instr. No. 27]. 
The City alleges that one of its "primary areas of focus during the trial was proving that 
TA breached the Bond Agreements by failing to complete the improvements and 
defeating TA's estoppel and waiver defenses." City's Brief at 7. None of the City's 
citations support its claim that it proved or "focused" on TA's failure to complete the 
public improvements was a breach of the Bond Agreements (as distinguished from a 
breach of the Development Agreement) or that it defeased TA's estoppel and waiver at 
trial. See City's Brief at 7 [citing R. 24337, pp. 1447-77 (The cited testimony concerns 
alleged deficiencies in the public improvements. However, the testimony does not 
specifically concern or distinguish the requirements of the Bond Agreements from those 
of the Development Agreement.); R. 24340, pp. 2130-44 (Citing testimony of City 
witnesses concerning the development and acceptance process of public improvements. 
However, the testimony does not reference the Bond Agreements. Rather the testimony 
discusses the obligation of completing the public improvements on 400 West as falling 
within the obligations of the Development Agreement, at p. 2143). The City further cites 
photo exhibits, which purportedly document public improvement deficiencies. City's 
Brief at 7. However, the photographs do not demonstrate that the City "focused" on 
waiver, estoppel, or distinguishing breach of the Bond Agreements from breach of the 
Development Agreement. 
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obligation of performance or breach is a difficult and tenuous distinction/'). Instead, 
the City's "focus" was on entering evidence that public improvements were incomplete, 
which it claimed was a breach of both agreements. [R. 24337, pp. 1447-77; 2434G, pp. 
2130-44; Photo. Exs. 622, 669, 693, 699]. 
Lastly, there is nothing incorrect or inconsistent with the footnote in the Pre-Trial 
Order25 that "a breach of the Bond Agreements . . . may not be considered a breach of the 
Development Agreement and a breach of the Development Agreement may not be 
considered a breach of the Bond Agreement." City's Brief at 44 (citing R. 21856, n.5). 
The Bond Agreements are subsumed by the Development Agreement but only pertain to 
public improvements. Accordingly, a breach of an unrelated subpart of the Development 
Agreement - for example failure to pay for secondary water used to irrigate the Overlake 
Golf Course - would not be a breach of the Bond Agreements, just as a curable, non-
completion of public improvements under the Bond Agreement does not impose the 
death penalty on the Development Agreement. 
3. The Trial Court correctly determined that the Jury found that the City 
"actively interfered" with TA's completion of public improvements. 
24
 Even the City acknowledges that the Trial Court is in the "best position to consider the 
case 'from the jury's perspective.'" City's Brief at 2. 
25
 The City contends that it "preserved" issues or arguments by including a note or 
statement in the Pre-trial Order, and that even though the City did not actually try or 
present the issue to the Jury, the untried issues can be used to harmonize the Jury's 
Verdict. City's Brief at 44, 52. The purpose of a pre-trial order is to define the issues 
that will be tried at trial - it does not "save" or preserve issues or arguments that the City 
failed to try or present to the Jury. 
16 
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The Trial Court's determination that the Jury found that the City "actively 
interfered" with TA's ability to complete the public improvements is clearly supported by 
the Jury's findings that the City engaged in the following conduct in material breach of 
the Development Agreement and Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: 
a. Slowing or refusing to give final inspections of the public improvements 
constructed by Tooele Associates in the Overlake Project Area's 
subdivision. [R. 22163, Quest. No. 1 .e]; 
b. Misrepresenting and misapplying its own public improvement ordinances 
in relation to the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions. [R. 22163, Quest. 
No.l.f]; 
c. Refusing to recognize and accept its own admissions that public 
improvements within the Overlake Project Area's subdivisions were 
complete. [R. 22163, Quest. No. 1 .g]; 
d. Requiring Tooele Associates to complete: public improvements to standards 
that are not found within the Development Agreement, the approved 
construction drawings, the Bond Agreements or the City's Ordinances 
and/or that are not required of other similar situated developers. [R. 22163, 
Quest No.l.h]; 
e. Refusing to approve, and threatening refusal of, applications for the 
creation of new subdivisions within the Overlake Project Area. [R. 22163, 
Quest. No. Li]; 
f. Further finding that TA did not materially breach the Development 
Agreement by failing to complete public improvements in Overlake. [R. 
22164, Quest. No. 2.a]. 
Turning a blind-eye to the Jury's findings, the City insists that that the Jury "nowhere 
indicated that the City somehow" interfered with TA's ability to complete public 
improvements, and that such findings would be incompatible with certain Jury 
Instructions. City's Brief at 36-37, 49. 
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The Trial Court correctly dismissed the City's arguments that certain Jury 
Instructions preclude a finding of intentional interference upon concluding that such 
argument is clearly undercut by the Jury's specific findings cited above. [R. 22163; 
24304-05]. The City's argument that certain Jury Instructions prevent a finding of 
intentional interference is an attempt to create unnecessary and nonexistent 
inconsistencies to make the Verdict appear irreconcilable. See City's Brief at 36-37, 49-
50. Speculating as to how the Jury applied each of the 99 pages of Jury Instructions to 
each specific question (particularly Jury Instructions on which there was not a direct 
question) does little to aid in harmonizing the Verdict, and does not create inconsistencies 
between the answers in the Verdict which would preclude reconciliation. 
4. The City's suggested interpretation of the terms and phrases "material," 
"and/or" and "as stated in question 2" in Question 3 do not support 
harmonization. 
The City argues that there is no conflict between Questions 3 and 8 if the Jury 
interpreted the waiver of claims of material breaches of the "Development Agreement 
and/or Bond Agreements" as waiver of material breaches of either the Development 
Agreement "or" the Bond Agreement, but not both. City's Brief at 25-26. The City 
dismisses, without explanation, the possibility that the Jury found waiver of claims of 
material breach of both agreements. Id, at 26. The City argues that is doesn't matter 
which agreement the Jury applied its finding of waiver to, as the result is the same; 
26Bennion v. Le Grand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Utah 1985) ("where 
the possibility of inconsistency . . . exists, the courts will not presume inconsistency; 
rather, they will seek to reconcile the answers if possible.") (emphasis added). 
18 
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arguing that a finding of non-waiver of the material breach of either agreement will result 
in termination of the Development Agreement and will preclude entry of the Jury's $22.5 
million damage award in favor of TA. Id. at 27-28. Last, the City concludes that it is 
most likely that the Jury found that the City waived only material breach claims under the 
Development Agreement, not the Bond Agreements. Id. The City argues that it is more 
likely that the Jury found the City waived its claim of material breach of the 
Development Agreement because the Jury Instruction on material breach only referenced 
the Development Agreement by name, and because Question 3 contains the description 
"as stated in Question 2." Id. at 27-30. 
The City's theory requires unsupported guesswork by the Court, first in 
speculating on what grounds the Jury could have intended to apply the "or" rather than 
the "and," and if "or," by speculating whether the finding was applied only to the 
Development Agreement or Bond Agreements. The City's argument that the Jury could 
not apply a basic principal of contract law such as "materiality" of a breach or 
"substantial performance" to one agreement but not the other simply because one 
agreement was identified by name in the Jury Instruction unreasonably doubts the 
intelligence of this Jury which carefully and thoughtfully rendered the Verdict. See 
City's Brief at 28, 32, 48-49 [referencing R. 22204; 22209; 2226527]. 
27 
Instructing, the "City contends that it was excused from performing its remaining 
obligations under the Development Agreement because of [TA's] conduct in failing to 
complete public improvements." This statement is an accurate description of both the 
City's Development Agreement and Bond Agreements claims, both of which the Jury 
rejected in finding that the City's performance was not excused. [Jury Instr. No. 63]. 
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The City's theory further requires the Court to ignore that it is just as likely, if not 
more so, that the Jury responded to Question 3 by finding that the City waived its 
material breach claims regarding the Development Agreement "and' the Bond 
Agreement. It is more likely that the Jury found the City waived material breach claims 
of both agreements, as opposed to one but not the other, as the Jury clearly found that TA 
was entitled to continued performance under the Development Agreement (meaning no 
termination pursuant to the Bond Agreements) and was damaged $22.5 million by the 
City's refusal to perform its obligations in good faith. Further, as pointed out by the Trial 
Court, the Jury did not have a basis to distinguish between the public improvement 
requirements of the two agreements, making "and" more likely than "or." 
TA previously explained that the descriptor "as stated in question 2" is not 
limiting language. TA's Brief at 31-37. The "question 2" language was included in 
Question 3 because the City originally drafted the question intending to deal only with 
the City's waiver of the material breaches of the Development Agreement. [R. 24341, 
pp. 2742-43]. However, the parties and the Court agreed to the concept of adding the 
Bond Agreements so that all of the City's claims and defenses would be addressed by 
Question 3. [R. 24341, pp. 2745-47; 24342, pp. 2824-26]. To stress the significance that 
28
 [R. 24306]. 
29 
Further, TA does not contend that the "as stated in question 2" language must be 
ignored or removed to harmonize the Verdict. Rather, it is a reasonable interpretation to 
apply the "question 2" language to the part of the question concerning material breach of 
the Development Agreement, without applying it to the part of the question addressing 
breach of the Bond Agreements. 
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the answer to Question 3 was to address all the City's claims and defenses, the City 
drafted a "blockade instruction" explaining that if the Jury answered "NO" to Question 3, 
that it must skip all remaining questions in Section I so that TA could not be awarded any 
damages, on any grounds. [R. 22165; 23110, p. 47]. Because the Jury responded "yes" 
to Question 3, it was permitted to proceed to answer Questions 4 and 5 of the Verdict and 
award TA damages. [R. 22165-66]. 
a. The City's argument that the concepts of "materiality" and 
"substantial performance" are only relevant to the Development 
Agreement is incorrect. 
The parties agree that a large distinction between Questions 3 and 8 is one of 
"materiality." City's Brief at 30.30 In response to Question 3, the Jury found that the City 
waived its claims and defenses of material breach of the Development Agreement and/or 
Bond Agreements, whereas in Question 8, the Jury found that the City had not waived its 
right to claim that TA did not complete public improvements required by the 
Development Agreement and Bond Agreements. [R. 22165-66]. 
The City argues that the concepts of "materiality" of a breach and "substantial 
performance" are only important in the context of TA's claims in Section I of the Verdict, 
but not the City's claims in Section II of the Verdict. City's Brief at 30, 48-49. 
However, the Jury was instructed that substantial performance and materiality of the 
City's alleged breach of the Bond Agreements is important to TA's defenses against the 
City's claims, which are the subject of Section II of the Verdict: "[TA] denies [the] City's 
The City reconciling Questions 3 and 8 as follows: the "jury found that the City waived 
certain 'material' breach claims, but not breach claims" 
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claims and in its defense claims that... TA substantially performed the, Development 
Agreement and Bond Agreements and committed no material breach of those 
Agreements." [R. 22201 (emphasis added)]. Further, the Jury was instructed that if it 
found that TA had committed a non-material breach of an agreement, the City was not 
excused from performance of its contractual obligations but may be entitled to 
compensation for the non-material breach. [R. 22265]. 
Throughout its Brief, the City argues that it has always claimed that under the 
Bond Agreements, TA's public improvements deficiencies allowed the City to deny new 
phase or plat requests, regardless of degree or materiality of the non-completion. City's 
Brief at 4-5, 22-24, 27-28, 30-33. The City claims that it cemented and preserved this 
theory in its "extensive Rule 56 motion practice," as well as in the Pre-Trial Order. Id. at 
4-5. However, the theory that the City repeatedly raised, and purportedly preserved in 
the Pre-trial Order, was that a material breach of the Bond Agreement was the legal basis 
upon which it could deny new phase requests and which excuses and discharges the 
City's performance of the Development Agreement. [R. 4516,31 21856,32 2191533]. 
In its Answer the City alleges, "Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, by 
reason of [TA's] material breaches of agreements between [TA] and the City, including 
[ ] the Bond Agreement." (emphasis added). 
32
 Arguing in its summary judgment pleadings that, "[t]he non-completion of the required 
public improvements also is a material breach of the Bond Agreements, and it allows the 
City to withhold approval of new phases and recover over $550,000 in damages." 
(emphasis added). 
33
 In the Pre-trial Order the City argued its claim that "[t]he non-completion of the 
required public improvements is a material breach of the Annexation Agreement, the 
22 
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It wasn't until after trial that the City advanced the argument that any hyper-
technical non-completion of public improvements - including, for example, a lamppost 
or stop sign being moved six inches from its location on an approved plan, a non-material 
breach which was the direct result of the City's "active interference" with TA's efforts to 
perform, or non-completion of public improvements which were not even included in the 
approved plans or Bond Agreements - absolves the City from all liability for its material 
breaches of the Development Agreement as found by the Jury. 
The City further argues "substantial performance" of the Bond Agreements is 
"irrelevant," as Utah law does not apply the doctrine of substantial performance to 
contracts which do not expressly provide that "substantial performance" is sufficient. 
City's Brief at 31. In support of this argument, the City cites Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah 
Dept. of Tramp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1369 (Utah 1993). Id. The facts of Reliance are 
distinguishable from this case. First, unlike here, the remedy sought by Plaintiff in 
Reliance was enforcement of a liquidated damages provision which was a reasonable 
forecast of the cost to fix the Defendant's breaches - not the death penalty for the entire 
Development Agreement for minor breaches. Id. at 1365-67. Second, the Reliance court 
noted that in order for Plaintiff to succeed on its claims, the Plaintiff had to have acted in 
good faith. Id. at 1370. There was no evidence to dispute that the Plaintiff in Reliance 
acted in good faith and did not contribute to the Defendant's non-completion. Id. In 
Development Agreement and the Bond Agreements, which excuse and discharge the 
City's performance of the Development Agreement, and it allows the City to withhold 
approval of new phases, disallow a second 10-year term of the Development Agreement, 
and recover over $550,000 in damages." (emphasis added). 
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contrast, in this case the Jury specifically found that the City acted in bad faith and 
"actively interfered" with TA's performance. [R. 24303]. Finally, the Reliance court did 
not rule that substantial performance is not enough if full performance is required under 
the contract. Rather, it left the door open for the application of substantial performance 
when the complained of non-completion is minor. Reliance, 858 P.2d at 1371.34 In this 
case, the complained of non-completions were minor in the context that the City's 
claimed cost of completion was only 2.7% of the total amount invested to date in 
Overlake, and the improvements were either not required by the approved plans or the 
parties agreed the improvements would be fully completed at a later time. See TA's Brief 
at 17, n. 19; see also Addendum A, attached hereto, at 4-8. 
The City further argues that "substantial performance" is only relevant to the 
Development Agreement. City's Brief at 31, 48. As explained herein, the Biond 
Agreements are subsumed by the Development Agreement. The Jury found that TA 
"substantially performed" all terms of the Development Agreement - including public 
improvements which were also the subject of the Bond Agreements - in finding that TA 
was entitled to a ten-year extension of the agreement.35 [R. 22162; Ex. 100 § XXIII]. 
34
 "There could be a case where the work remaining on a contracted project was so trivial 
that assessing the entire liquidated amount would result in gross unfairness. However, 
this is not such a case." 
35
 Had the Jury found that TA had not substantially performed, the City's performance 
would have been excused and the Jury could not and would not have found that TA 
proved its damages caused by the City's breaches to a reasonable certainty. [R. 22209, 
Jury Instr. No. 35; R. 22165-66]. Further, TA's performance was "substantial" enough 
for the City to reduce the bond amounts, continue approving permits and collecting state 
24 
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The Jury was not presented any basis upon which to find that while TA substantially 
performed the public improvement requirements under the Development Agreement, that 
it did not substantially perform the public improvement requirements under the Bond 
Agreements. [R. 24306].36 
b. Questions 3 and 8 can be reconciled, and Question 3 does not need 
to "give way" to Question 8 or be "disregarded" as suggested by the 
Oty, 
The City argues that Question 8 (dealing only with public improvement claims 
under the agreements) is more specific than Question 3 (dealing will all the City's claims 
and defenses of material breach of the agreements) and therefore must control. City's 
Brief at 33. However, Questions 3 and 8 can be reconciled and are sufficiently different 
so that one is not required to "give way" to the other. TA's Brief at 21-22. 
The City further argues that if either Question 3 or Question 8 is unsupported by 
the evidence, it may be disregarded or "set aside" to "dissipate" the inconsistency 
between the answers. City's Brief at 34. As pointed out by the dissent in the Milligan v. 
Capitol Furniture Co., 335 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Utah 1959), it is difficult to determine 
maintenance funds on the roads which were completedi as reflected in the approved plans 
and/or per agreement of the parties. [TA's Brief at 50, n. 40; City's Brief at 12; 
Addendum "A" attached hereto at 4-8]. 
Further, going in to trial the City had knowledge that TA's substantial performance of 
the Bond Agreements was relevant and that it was to be determined by the Jury. [R. 
20834 Tf 3]. However, if the issue of substantial performance of the Bond Agreements is 
determined to have been omitted from the Verdict, a mistrial is not required. Rather, if 
the Verdict is interpreted under Rule 49(a), the issue should be remanded to the Trial 
Court for Judge Skanky to make a finding thereon, or a finding in accord with the 
judgment entered shall be deemed to have been made. UTAH R. Civ. P. 49 (a). 
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which of two purportedly inconsistent questions lacks evidentiary support or is "less 
supported/' and such determination is often arbitrary as it is equally logical to disregard 
the "prevailing" question as it is the "disregarded" question.37 
While this suggested approach of disregarding one answer over another does not 
harmonize the Verdict, there is far more support for Question 3 than there is for Question 
8. The City's "active interference" with TA's performance, refusal to recognize and 
accept its own admissions that public improvements were complete, material breaches, 
and bad faith all support the Jury's finding of waiver of all of the City's material breach 
claims in Question 3. [R. 14359; 22162-64; 24302-03]. In contrast, the only example 
identified by the City in support of its argument that Question 3 is not supported by the 
evidence is the Jury's finding that the City waived TA's material breach concerning 
failure to pay all amounts owed for secondary water used to irrigate the Overlake Golf 
Course. City's Brief at 35. As explained below, there is ample evidence supporting the 
Jury's finding of waiver of material breach related to secondary water, and the City is 
simply ignoring what actually transpired at trial. 
B. THE CITY'S ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AFFIRMING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL ARE BASED ON FALSE 
STATEMENTS OF FACT AND/OR ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY LAW. 
A key distinction between this case and the Milligan case was that the Milligan Court 
was able to disregard the jury's finding on proximate causation because the finding was a 
question of law, not a question of fact which the trial court was required to defer to the 
determination of the jury. Milligan, 335 P.2d at 622. In this case, both Questions 3 and 8 
concern waiver, a mixed issue of fact and law to be determined exclusively by the Jury. 
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1. The evidence supports the Jury's finding that the City waived TA's 
material breach for failure to pay for secondary water to irrigate the Golf 
Course. 
The City's claim that "TA presented nothing that indicated or inferred that the 
City waived its claim that TA materially breached the Development Agreement by failing 
to pay amounts owed for golf course irrigation water" is categorically false. City's Brief 
at 19, 54. Pursuant to Amendment #4 to the Development Agreement, adopted in 
January 2002, the City was required to provide TA with quarterly invoices based upon 
metered readings of actual secondary water usage for irrigation of the Overlake Golf 
Course. [Ex. 105 § 8]. The City, however, failed to even install the meters until 
February 25, 2004, and even after eventually installing the meters, the City refused to 
provide invoices including metered readings showing actual secondary water use until 
March 1, 2007. [R. 24340, pp. 2365-66; Ex. 546]. TA, however, regularly paid the 
•JO 
inadequate invoices under protest. [R. 24333, pp. 212-13]. Finally, on November 21, 
2006, TA made a partial payment of an invoice which did not contain the meter readings 
and explained that because the invoice was not based upon metered readings, TA was 
making a partial payment based on its own estimate of actual usage. [Ex. 545]. 
It soon became clear to TA that the City was also including charges for other 
expenses allegedly owed to the City in the secondary water statements, and was further 
allegedly crediting funds the City owed to TA related to the "latecomers resolution" 
(reimbursement for infrastructure installed by TA but used by other developers) to TA's 
For nearly three years after the meters were installed, the City did not explain its 
refusal to provide invoices supported by metered readings, as required. 
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secondary water bill. TA never consented to this crediting and offset process. [R. 24333, 
pp. 220-21; Ex. 546]. Accordingly, before paying additional amounts the City claimed 
were due and owing, TA requested a full accounting showing all secondary water charges 
based on quarterly meter readings (or engineers' estimates before the meters were 
installed), payments made by TA, and all latecomers fees the City purportedly credited 
and offset against TA secondary water bills. Id. As of the date of trial, the City had 
failed and refused to provide TA with the requested accounting documenting the true 
amount owed for actual water usage. Id. 
The Jury found that TA materially breached the Development Agreement by 
failing to pay amounts owed for the secondary water used to irrigate the golf course. [R. 
22164-65, Quest. No. 2.e.]. However, the City's conduct in refusing to comply with the 
billing requirements of Section 8 of Amendment #4 for over five years after the 
Amendment was adopted, and further refusal to provide an accounting documenting all 
water use, payments and credits or offsets, supports the Jury's finding that the City 
waived40 such breach. [R. 22165, Quest. No. 3]. 
2. The Jury's finding that the City materially breached the Development 
Agreement by refusing to approve TA's September 5, 2006 request for 
assignment is supported by the evidence. 
39
 TA testified that if the City provided TA with the information requested in the 
accounting, TA was willing to pay the amount actually owed. 
40
 As explained in TA's Brief, even though the Jury found waiver of material breach, the 
Jury intended to make both parties whole by awarding the City its damages for the cost of 
completion (or the difference between substantial and complete performance) under the 
doctrine of partial breach. TA's Brief at 24-25. 
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The City argues that the Jury had no basis upon which to determine that the City 
materially breached the Development Agreement by refusing to recognize and accept 
assignments of the Development Agreement to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC and others 
as found in Question 1(b). City's Brief at 55. The City's argument is based entirely on 
its claim that the City was not required to "provide after-the-fact consent to assignments." 
Id. 
The City's argument ignores TA's September 5, 2006 request for the City's prior 
approval of "assignment of the right and obligations of Tooele Associates, L.P., and John 
Tooele, LLC, under the Development Agreement for the Overlake Project Area to certain 
third-parties." [Ex. 516]. The request specifies that "enclosed are Assignments which 
would effectuate the [requested] assignment." Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Section XVIII 
of the Development Agreement expressly provides that consent of the City shall not be 
"unreasonably withheld" and that the City will review requests for assignment for the 
limited purpose of determining whether the assignee is "of sufficient financial ability to 
assume the provisions, terms, and conditions of this Agreement." [Ex. 100 § XVIII]. 
The request complied with the requirement of Section XVIII of the Development 
Agreement by informing that "[t]he assignees have the financial ability to meet the 
obligations of the Development Agreement and are willing to provide the City with 
reasonable assistance to verify that fact." Id:, [Ex. 516]. Even if the City had found that 
the proposed assignees did not "have sufficient financial ability to assume and fully carry 
out the provisions, terms and conditions" of the Development Agreement," the assignee 
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was still to be assigned a portion of the agreement, and TA would simply remain 
responsible for the performance of all obligations of the Development Agreement. Id. 
The City's failure and refusal to consent, in any degree, to TA's September 5, 
2006 request for prior approval of a proposed assignment is sufficient evidence to 
support the Jury's finding that the City breached the Development Agreement and the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing "[b]y refusing to recognize and approve 
assignments of the Development Agreement to Perry/Tooele Associates, LLC, Perry 
Homes, Inc., L.H. Perry Investment, LLC and Overlake Golf, LLC." [R. 22162]. 
3. The City waived and failed to preserve any claim that the amount of 
damages the Jury awarded to TA are excessive. 
The City's arguments that TA's damage award is excessive and that TA was 
limited to amounts described in the Pre-trial Order are misguided and were not preserved 
for this appeal. City's Brief at 56-57. 
Juries are generally allowed wide discretion in the assessment of damages. 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985). The Jury 
was presented with various theories on damage calculation as well as amounts, and 
ultimately arrived at its damage calculations based on the testimony of the City's expert, 
Jason Burningham-not TA's expert or method of calculation. The report of Jason 
Burningham,41 admitted as an exhibit at trial, provides three different methods of 
In the Pre-trial Order, TA disclosed that it may call Jason Burningham as a witness for 
its case in chief. [R. 21916]. 
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calculation of TA's damages resulting in totals adjusted to "net present value" ranging 
from over $38 million to over $27 million, with a weighted average of over $30 million. 
[Ex. 922, p. 7] (A copy of Exhibit 922, Burningham's report, is attached hereto as 
Addendum "B"). After hearing the evidence concerning the City's wrongful, bad-faith 
actions against TA, the Jury responded by calculating TA's damages at $22.5 million, 
which amount was clearly supported by the City's own expert's calculations (and was in 
fact almost $5 million less than the City's expert's lowest calculation) and not 
"excessive." [R. 22166, Quest. No. 5]. 
Second, the City waived its objection to excessive damages by not requesting a 
Jury Instruction limiting the damage calculations to the amount TA identified in the Pre-
trial Order. The City also waived its objection by providing the Jury with a blank space 
to write in any number the Jury believed was supported by the evidence, without a 
limiting instruction. 
Third, the City did not raise its claim that the Jury award was excessive to the 
Trial Court,43 therefore, the issue was not preserved for appeal. Tschaggeny v. Milbank 
Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, % 20, 163 P.3d 615, 620. Fourth, the City did not raise the issue of 
42
 (1) Market Value Enhancement (comparable sales method) calculated at a net present 
value of $29,557,003; (2) Market Value Enhancement based on Project (Pro Forma) 
Income Approach calculating lost net cash flow of $104,211,400, reduced to a net present 
value of $38,304,348; and (3) Market Value Enhancement based on benefit/cost of 
annexation and development approval calculating lost "benefits/(cost)" at a net present 
value of $27,333,185. 
43
 The City did not raise its excessive damages claim at trial before the Jury was released 
or in its Motion for Entry of Judgment. [R. 22490-510]. 
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excessive damage award in its Cross-Petition to Appeal Interlocutory Order. Houghton v. 
Dep't of Health, 2005 UT 63, ^ 16, 125 P.3d 860, 865 ("[o]n interlocutory appeal, only 
those specific issues presented in the petition and cross-petition will be reviewed.5'). 
Accordingly, the issue is not properly before this Court at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
The Verdict is consistent. A simple and clear theory of interpretation exists which 
harmonizes the Verdict responses and is consistent with the Jury Instructions. Tooele 
Associates should be awarded $22.5 million in damages, and the City should be awarded 
$1.75 million to ensure that any remaining public improvements are fully completed and 
that it is compensated for secondary water. Accordingly, Tooele Associates respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the Trial Court's declaration of a mistrial, interpret the 
Verdict harmoniously, and remand to the Trial Court with instructions to enter judgment 
based on the harmonized Verdict. 
ADDENDUM 
Attached hereto in the Addendum are: (A) Explanation and description of the 
•ift6Q£pect and false representations in the City's Brief; and (B) the July 15, 2008 expert 
report of Jason Burningham. 
DATED thisyQday of May, 2011. 
BRUCE R. BAiRiyP.C. MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
Attorneys for Tooele Associates Lauren Parry Johnson 
Attorneys for Tooele Associates 
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ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
SECTION I: ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO 
ANNEXATION & DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
Lewis Young Robertson & Burningham, Inc. ("LYRB") was retained by Holme Roberts & Owen 
LLP ("HRO") to analyze the economic costs / benefits to Tooele City and Tooele Associates LP 
("TA") related to i) the annexation of approximately 2,100 acres of land (which was originally in 
unincorporated Tooele County) into Tooele City, and ii) the Development Agreement, originally 
dated December 18, 1997, and amended 4/21/98, 7/1/98, 10/6/99, 1/23/01, and 7/3/07. Based on 
the information provided to LYRB it was concluded that the City has incurred a substantial 
amount of un-recouped costs and there was significant economic benefit to TA arising from 
both the annexation and development agreements. Although the annexation only included 
2,100 acres, the total amount of land owned or controlled by TA was 2,791 acres. This is an 
important distinction as the development agreement enhanced all 2,791 acres not just the 2,100 
acres related to the annexation. 
MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT METHODOLOGIES 
LYRB used three methodologies to estimate the market value enhancement related to the 
annexation and development approval associated with TA's land. The first approach discussed 
herein is the comparable sales methodology. Similar to a real estate appraisal, the comparable 
sales methodology uses documentation where comparable land was offered purchased and/or 
sold. From 1995, several documents presented provided a basis for establishing a market value 
enhancement related to both annexation and development approval. The second approach 
presented is an income approach. The income approach uses TA's pro forma cash flow based 
on what they and their investors anticipated receiving as a result of the annexation and 
development approval. The income approach uses density, land-uses, projected market 
absorption and value to determine a return on invested capital The third approach used in this 
analysis is the cost approach. This approach evaluates the various costs which would typically 
be borne by the developer (TA) but which were negotiated to be paid by or financed by Tooele 
City (the "City"). The cost approach used herein focused primarily on the water and 
wastewater systems of the City. The costs associated with these two systems were significant 
concessions made by the City and therefore included in the evaluation of market enhancement 
received by TA, 
COMPARABLE SALES METHODOLOGY 
Under the comparable sales methodology, LYRB used several documents to establish market 
value enhancement associated with either annexation or development approval. The 
documents include: 
** TA's May 3,1995, Partnership Meeting Agenda; 
rf TA Memorandum Regarding December 1994 Report (Deposition Exhibit 118); 
H TA's Sales Proposal 1995-96 {Deposition Exhibit 108); 
S Real Estate Purchase Contract 1/15/98; 
^ Settlement Statement (Deposition Exhibit 708); 
W Letter from Drew Hall to Rebecca Kenison, dated 8/17/98 (Deposition Exhibit 830); and 
^ September 2000 Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
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ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
According to TA's Memorandum regarding the December 1994 Report, the following statement 
is made, "fair market values for property in the County are in the range of $3,000 per acre. 
Inside the City, fair market values for property are in the range of $5,000 per acre. Therefore, we 
will work to annex as much property as possible/' LYRB used this statement to establish that 
annexation of the 2,100 acres created an additional $4.2M of economic gain to TA and its 
partners. A table below shows the calculation. 
TABU 1.1 MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT RELATED TO ANNEXATION 
LAND A C R E A G E V A L U E $ A M O U N T 
Prior to Annexation 2,100 acres @ $3,000/acre = $6,300,000 
After Annexation 2,100 acres @ $5,000/acre = $10,500,000 
ENHANCED VALUE OF ANNEXATION: $4,200,000 (2,100 acres @ 52,000/acre) 
Additionally, it was noted that TA developed a sales proposal in 1995-96 wherein they 
described the benefit of annexation (Deposition Exhibit 108) and determined that the asking 
pricing for bulk-sale consideration was $9,750 per acre. 
The second component related to the comparable sales methodology was the value created by 
the negotiation of a development agreement between TA and the City. After receiving approval 
for annexation TA negotiated a development agreement with the City. LYRB relied on a real 
estate purchase contract between John Tooele LLC and Perry & Associates Inc. where John 
Tooele LLC sold 138.5 acres on January 15, 1998 for a purchase price of $16,000 per acre or 
$2,216,000. The 138.5 acres were originally purchased on July 17, 1996 for approximately 
$400,000 or $2,888 per acre pursuant to an August 17, 1996 letter from Drew Hall to Rebecca 
Kenison (Deposition Exhibit 830). Furthermore, LYRB was presented with an additional real 
estate purchase contract dated September 2000 where 100 acres of Overtake property was sold 
to Resource Research Ltd. for $1,800,000 or $18,000 per acre. Therefore, using the comparable 
sales (real estate purchase contracts) LYRB determined that an additional $13,000 per acre was 
created as a result of annexation and development approval. Provided below in table 1.2 is a 
summary of the derivation related to this calculation. 
TABLE 1.2 MAKKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL 
LAND ACREAGE VALUE $ AMOUNT i 
Value of Land with Annexation (2,791 acres @ $5k/acre) $13,955,000.00 
Value of Land with Annexation and Development Approval (2,791 acres (a) 
$18k/acre) ' $50,238,000.00 
ENHANCED VALUE OF DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL: $36,283,000.00 
Based on the calculations presented in table 1.1 and 1.2, the market value enhancement related 
to the annexation and development approval is $40,483,000 or $29,557,003 in net present value 
terms. 
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ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
TABLE 1.3: SUMMARY or MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT (COMPARABLE SALES METHODOLOGY) 
. MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT AMOUNT 
Increased Value to Overlake Related to Annexation $4,200,000.00 
Market Value increase Resulting from Annexation/Development Approval 36,283,000.00 
Total Market Value Enhancement $40,483,000.00 
Net Present Value @ 5.00% (1995-2009): $29,557,003.00 
PROJECT INCOME METHODOLOGY 
The second approach used by LYRB in analyzing and assessing the market value enhancement 
related to the annexation and development approval of the Overlake Project was the project 
income approach. This approach uses the Overlake Project Report, dated December 11, 1997 
(Deposition Exhibit 819). In said report TA presents its projected cash flow related to 
development costs, pro forma revenues and market absorption. Therein, it was estimated that 
the total cash receipts would be $285M for the period 1995-2009. Conversely, the analysis 
projects that the cash disbursements (costs) would be $181M for the same time period. Using an 
internal rate of return of 9.00%, the net present value of said cash flow is $38M. Thus, TA's 
conclusion, based on the income approach, would demonstrate that the annexation and 
development approval of the 2,791 acres would generate a market value (based on cash flow) of 
$38M. 
TABLE J.4: MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT BASED ON PROJECT (PKO FORMA) INCOME APPROACH 
TOTALS (1995-2009) 
$250,077,000 
9,680,000 
35,718,000 
1,250,000 
708,000 
(11,898,000) 
$285,535,000 
132,426,000 "" 
12,495,000 
7,320,000 
6,840,000 
13,242,600 
9,000,000 
$181,323,600 
$104,211,400 
NET PRESENT VALUE 
$154,303,489 
$101,451,431 
\ $38,304,348 
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ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
BENEFIT/COST METHODOLOGY 
The third approach used by LYRB in determining the value created by the aruiexation and 
development approval of the Overlake Project was the benefit/(cost) approach. This 
methodology identifies all extraordinary development related costs typically borne by the 
developer or land owner. LYRB focused on primarily on the benefits to TA associated with the 
culinary water and wastewater systems. The development agreement outlines several 
considerations made by the City to participate in the development of Overlake. 
A benefit related to the development agreement was water rights. The development agreement 
provided development approval to TA including necessary water rights as a condition to the 
development. Subsequently, the City adopted a revised policy related to development whereby 
all new development was required to bring adequate water rights to the City for development 
consideration. The related benefit of not having to turn over water rights to the City for 
development approval is estimated at $3,500 per acre feet; according to a January 26, 2000 letter 
from Drew Hall to Thomas Devore (no attempt was made to substantiate this amount). According 
to the 12/11/1997 TA Report there were 7,500 single family dwelling units, 2,400 multi-family 
dwelling units and 115 acres of commercial development projected. Based on the premise that 
each equivalent residential unit (ERU) requires 1 acre foot per year of water, the total number of 
ERUs projected within Overlake was 9,260 ERUs. Applying the $3,500 per acre feet for 9,260 
ERUs would cost the City $32,410,000. 
Additionally, the City agreed to develop a wastewater treatment plant (WWTP) down gradient 
from most of the Overlake Project and determined that it would develop advance treatment in 
order to treat effluent to a standard level so Overlake could use the advance treated water for 
irrigation purposes, primarily related to the golf course. TA dedicated 30 acres of land for a site 
for the WWTP, estimated at a value of $31,050 prior to annexation. Later, TA dedicated 
approximately 75 acres for storage lakes at a value of $77/625.1 In consideration of these 
dedications the City constructed the WWTP, related collection line (Interceptor A), storage 
ponds, and other related water reuse capital facilities. 
The City added an advanced treatment component to their WWTP in order to accommodate TA 
and its desire to irrigate its golf course and development. The advance treatment costs for the 
additional treatment is estimated by taking the total number of ERUs (9,260) and multiplying 
this by 70%, which is estimated as the amount of effluent related to each ERU. The product of 
this calculation is multiplied by $200 per acre foot, resulting in the total amount of additional 
operation and maintenance costs to provide the benefit to TA. The total estimated cost/benefit 
related to advance treatment (O&M) is $6,222,171. 
In order to store the advance treated water for secondary water purposes, the City constructed 
storage ponds. Alternatively, if the City did not add an advance treatment component, the City 
1
 This is an approximate acreage amount alleged by TA. No attempt has been made to verify this amount. 
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ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
would not have incurred the storage element of the project. The cost associated with the storage 
ponds was $3.6M of which 88.65% related to the TA benefit or $3,191,400. 
Interceptor A was constructed to accommodate additional growth within the City included for a 
considerable benefit to TA. The total cost to construct Interceptor A was $1.362M of which Vi of 
the demand would be created by the Overtake Project. For purposes of this analysis we used 
$681,250. 
The WWTP cost the City $12,257,546 to construct with a capacity of 2.35MGD of service 
capacity. Based on the 9,260 ERU's projected in Overtake, the total proportional benefit related 
to TA was estimated at $10,866,235, or 88% of the capacity. 
In summary, the total cost/benefit related to: 1) water rights, 2) proportional benefit of advance 
treatment (O&M), 3) proportional benefit of storage ponds, 4) proportional share of interceptor 
A, and 5) proportional benefit of the WWTP is $55,341,558. Using a discount rate of 9.00% the 
total market value enhancement for TA using the cost approach is $27.33M. Table 1.5 below 
presents a summary of the cost/benefit analysis. 
TABit 1.5: MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT BASED ON BI-NKFIT/(COST) OF ANNEXATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL 
CULINARY WATER 
Water Rights 
TOTAL CULINARY WATER BENEFITS/(COSTS) 
SANITARY SEWER SYSTEM 
Dedication of 30 Acres for WWTP 
Dedication of 75 Acres for Storage Lakes 
Proportional benefit to TA for Advance Treatment (O&M) 
Proportional benefit to TA for Storage Ponds 
Proportional benefit to TA for Interceptor A 
Proportional benefit to TA for WWTP 
TOTAL SANITARY SEWER BENEFITS/(COSTS) 
TOTAL BENEFIT/(COST) OF DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT: 
TOTALS (1995-2009) 
$32,410,000 
$32,410,000 
(31,050) 
(77,625) 
6,222,171 
3,191,400 
681,250 
10,866,235 
20,961,055 
$55,341,558 
NET PRESENT VALUE 
$27,333,185 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT 
LYRB reviewed each methodology described above and concluded that in order to derive the 
true market value enhancement related to the annexation and development approvals, a 
weighting criteria must be used to make a determination of TA's benefit. Each method was 
weighted based on its relative value and accuracy. LYRB determined that the most complete 
and accurate methodology identified was the comparable sales approach. This approach is 
truly indicative of what the TA land as it represents actual comparable sales. This demonstrates 
the greatest reliability in forecasting value and therefore we weighted this methodology by 
applying 80% to this approach. 
The income approach is a reasonable way to determine prospective value but is often greatly 
discounted because of the uncertainty or probability of its outcome. LYRB in reviewing the TA 
assumptions concluded that the TA pro forma was an exaggerated starting point and concluded 
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development densities that were not necessarily substantiated. Therefore, LYRB applied a 
weighting of only 10% due to the difficulty in validating assumptions used by TA in developing 
its pro forma and cash flow model. 
The cost approach similarly relied upon forecasted development densities and absorption rates, 
which could not be validated by LYRB. Similarly, the cost approach was only weighted at a 
10% level. 
Using this weighting matrix, LYRB concludes that the market value enhancement generated by 
virtue of the annexation and development approval was $30,209,356. Table 1.6 below provides 
a summary of the weighted calculations and concluded market value enhancement 
determination. 
TABLE 1.6: WEIGHTED AVERAGE MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT CREATED B\ ANNEXATION .AND 
DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL 
SUMMARY OF VALUE 
Value Enhancement: Comparable Sales Approach 
Value Enhancement: Income Approach 
Value Enhancement: Cost Approach 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT CREATED 
BY ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL:
 e o A o n n o c c 
$30,209,356 
LYRB has relied upon the information which was presented and outlined previously in this report. 
LYRB acknowledges that as information becomes available modifications, revisions and edits may 
become necessary and will be made to this analysis in order to update the estimated market value 
enhancement received by TA. 
/EIGHTED% 
80.00% 
10.00% 
10.00% 
NPV AMOUNT 
$29,557,003 
38,304,348 
27,333,185 
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SECTION II; COST/BENEFIT TO CITY FROM PROJECT 
When development occurs within the City, the City v/ill receive incremental increases in tax 
revenues which will be offset by actual costs of sendees to the development.2 In some cases this 
is a net benefit; in others a net loss. The following analysis will demonstrate that the 
development of the Project has resulted in a net loss of approximately $10.0mm to the City. 
The remainder of Section II will be according to the following format: (1) discussion of the 
genera] methodology utilized to generate the conclusions in this section, (2) a discussion of the 
general fund revenues generated by the Project broken down by type with a discussion of any 
specific methodology used, and (3) a similar discussion of the general fund expenditures 
associated with the Project also broken down by type with a discussion of any specific 
methodology used. 
METHODOLOGY 
The basis for estimating revenues and expenditures comes from an underlying build-out 
schedule. This report assumes the actual build-out schedule as provided by Tooele City. The 
following table represents a summary of the build-out schedule: 
TAm.F.2.l - B U T I . O - O U T S U M M A R Y 
DEVELOPMEMTTYPE ! 1997 
Highway Commercial 
acres 
Retail Commercial 
(acres) 
Neighborhood 
Commercial (acres) 
Single Family Detached 
1998 1 1999 
i 
i 
i 
164 133 
2000 I 2001 
.6 
123 
6.5 
108 
2002 
6.5 
1.0 
45 
2003 
2.5 
17 
2004 
31 
2005 
60 
2006 
19 
TOTAL 
13.0 
3.5 
.6 
708 
Source: See Table C.1 in Appendix C and Note 2 below 
The majority of both revenue and expenditure estimates are generated based upon assessed 
value. Assessed value estimates for commercial were based upon a land value component and 
a building value component. The land values were estimated for 1998 at $16,000 per acre3 and 
inflated at the same rate as the average year over year home price in Tooele City for each 
respective year.4 The building value was determined utilizing a $150/sf commercial building 
cost for 2008 utilizing Marshal and Swift Construction estimator and deflated at the UDOT 
Construction Inflation Index for each respective year. This per sf cost was then multiplied by 
the square footage of commercial building for each year which was calculated utilizing a .205 
" This is referencing only the City's General Fund. The City's Enterprise Funds are structured such that revenues should be directly 
offset by expenses for services. 
Real Estate Purchase Contract between Perry & Associates Inc. and John Tooele LLC for 138.5 acre purchase dated 1/15/1998. 
4 
Wasatch Front Regional Multiple Listing Services 2003-2008 Average Home Prices (listing prices not sales prices) sales price are 
typically lower than the listing prices—using the MLS listing describes a higher value than the sales pricing). 
LYRB estimate from similar projects. 
P a g e 
LEWIS YOUNG ROBERTSON & BURNINGHAM, INC. SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 io 1 OFFICE 801.596.0700 FAX 801.596.2800 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TOOELE ASSOCIATES VS. TOOELE CITY, UTAH 
ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
floor area ratio per acre (FAR). Residential values were estimated based upon average sales 
prices in Tooele City which includes both land and building value. This information was 
available for 2003 to 2008 and extrapolated back to 1998 in such a manner that the year over year 
change in value was between 4.5% and 5.5%. 
Actual assessed property values were estimated from per year using the above method and 
were further decreased by 90% to estimate the construction or sale value to assessed value based 
upon historic experience from LYRB research. Residential property was further discounted for 
purposes of property tax values by 45% as per Utah Code. Personal property values for 
commercial property was estimated at 20% of building value with an annual depreciation 
reduction assuming a straight line depreciation on a seven-year cycle with 30% salvage value. 
Utilizing this methodology, it was estimated that the total value of the Project will be 
approximately $55mm in 2009 based upon actual development. For greater detail on values 
and absorption, see Table C.l- Actual Build-out Summary and Table C.2 - Property Value 
Schedule in Appendix C. 
REVENUE GENERATION 
Direct General Fund revenue associated with the Project was estimated based upon the build-
out schedule above and includes Property Tax, Sales and Use Tax, Energy Sales and Use Tax, 
and Telecommunication Tax. Other fees, impact fees, and user charges including those within 
enterprise funds were assumed to be charged at an efficient rate such that revenues cover 
expenditures. Such efficiency is unlikely on a project to project basis in the General Fund. The 
following paragraphs in this subsection will describe the estimated revenue generated from the 
taxes mentioned above as well as a discussion of the methodology for estimating each. 
PROPERTY TAX REVENUE 
Property Tax Revenue is based upon the assessed value multiplied by the property tax rate. 
Historic Tooele City property tax rates were received from the Utah State Tax Commission 
Property Tax Division. These rates were multiplied against the estimated assessed value for all 
real and personal property as discussed in the Methodology section above. This produced an 
estimated yearly cash flow for property tax. This analysis estimates that Property Tax 
generation related to the Project would be approximately $1.25mm from 1995 to 2009. See Table 
C.3 - Property Tax Revenue Increase in Appendix C for greater detail. 
SALES TAX REVENUE 
Direct Sales Tax Revenue was estimated using an average sales per square foot value of $200 in 
2006.6 This was inflated/deflated at 2.41% per year which represents the 2007 5-year CPI trend. 
The resultant yearly sales per square foot were multiplied by the completed commercial square 
footage per year to estimate direct taxable retail sales for each year. The direct sales figure for 
each year was then multiplied by 0.50% which is the point-of-sale guaranteed sales tax revenue 
the City would be assured to collect. This analysis estimates that the Sales Tax Revenue that 
would have been generated off of the 17 acres of commercial land and paid to the City from 
6
 2006 Figure inflated/deflated at 3%. Dollars & Cents of Shopping Centers/The SCORE 2006; Urban Land Institute. Table 1-9 
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1995 to 2009 is or will be $1.22mm. See Table C.4 - Multi-year Sales Tax Increment Forecast in 
Appendix C for greater detail. 
ENERGY SALES AND USE TAX 
The Energy Sales and Use Taxes collected by the City are made up of two components: Electric 
and Natural Gas. Both of these taxes are found by estimating the energy expense per square 
foot for commercial and residential unit for residential and multiplying that by the respective 
build-out for a given year. The US Energy Information Administration provides estimates of 
energy expenses for both commercial and residential properties. The respective expenditure for 
residential and commercial electric and gas usage comes from a Dec 2006 USEIA report with 
2003 data. These amounts were either inflated or deflated to arrive at each year's value by 
inflation information provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics which reported 1.5% inflation 
for Electricity and 77% for Natural Gas.7 
This information generated a yearly gross energy expense for both electricity and natural gas 
from the Project. These gross amounts were then multiplied against the City's 6% rate to 
produce the annual energy sales and use taxes. This analysis estimates that the Electric Energy 
Sales and Use Tax is or will be $537k from 1995 - 2009. Natural Gas Sales and Use Tax for the 
same period is or will be $818k. See Table C.5 - Multi-year Electric Sales and Use Tax 
Projections and Table C.6 - Multi-year Natural Gas Sales and Use Tax Projections in Appendix 
C for greater detail. 
TELECOMMUNICATION TAX 
The 2003 Utah State Legislature passed Senate Bill 23 which allows municipalities to collect a 4% 
telecommunication tax. This amount was changed in 2006 to 3.5%. The BLS Telephone Service 
Report Feb 2007 Table 12.1 provides annual residential and business telephone annual user fees 
for both wired and wireless communication for both historic and future years. This analysis 
estimated the number of businesses per highway commercial at 2, retail commercial at 4 and 
neighborhood commercial at 6 per acre. Each business was assumed to have an average of 5 
lines. Utilizing the BLS tables and these estimated businesses per acre, this analysis was able to 
generate estimated annual telephone charges per year. This was multiplied by 4% for 2005 -
2006 and then by 3.5% for 2007 - 2009 to produce the estimate of $170k in taxes from 2005 to 
2009. See Table C.7 - Multi-year Telecommunications License Tax Projections in Appendix C for 
greater detail 
In Summary, the estimated direct tax revenue to the City from the Project based upon the actual 
build-out schedule provided by the City for 1995 - 2009 is or will be $4mm. Table 2.2 below and 
Tables B.l - Summary and B.2 - Summary Multi-year Cash Flow in Appendix B provide 
summaries of this information. 
Trends in Telephone Service, Feb 2007, Table 12.1 - Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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T A B L E 2.2~ R E V E N U E S U M M A R Y 
REVENUE TYPE " j 
Property Tax 
Sales Tax 
Electric Sales & Use Tax 
Natural Gas Sales & Use Tax 
Telecom License Tax 
Total Revenue 
$ 
' $ 
TOTAL 
1,251,110 
1,224,657 
537,055 
818,006 
' 170,534" 
4,001,363 , 
EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 
When development occurs within the City, the City is responsible to provide municipal services 
to the development. In the case of utilities and other services provided by the City's enterprise 
funds, the revenue collections are such that rates cover expenditures. In the case of services that 
are funded through the City's General Fund, the collection of revenues to cover expenditures is 
much less efficient. Some projects cover costs and others do not. The expenditure categories 
used in this analysis are General Government, Public Safety, Streets & Highways, Parks and 
Recreation, and Capital Projects. 
In order to determine the level of expenditure for the Project, the level of expenditure related to 
the Project for each department funded through the General Fund was estimated and projected. 
The general methodology for assigned costs to each department was to generate a cost of service 
per assessed value for each type of service, estimate the portion of that cost that was fixed or 
variable, and then estimate the cost related to the new assessed value brought online from the 
Project. This analysis used the base year cost of service per assessed value using the 1999 
assessed value ($666.3mm) and 1999 City Financial Statement. These numbers were then 
inflated or deflated at 3% per year. All services were assumed to have a variable cost ratio of 
25% of all departmental costs and all department expenditures exclude capital projects. 
GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
A portion of the general government overhead such as administration, public buildings, etc 
would have been marginally increased due to the development of the Project. This analysis has 
estimated the additional increase in general government expenditure allocated to the project 
through the methodology described above. 
Following the methodology detail above with the 1999 General Government Expenditure of 
$1.53mm, the marginal increase to General Government due to the Project from 1995 to 2009 
would have been $330k. Additionally, Paul Hansen in Engineering and Bruce Parker in 
Planning provided a disproportionate level of service to the Project which equated to 
approximately $27k for a total General Government Expenditure of $357k. For greater detail see 
Table C.8 - Multi-year General Government Expenditure Projections in Appendix C 
PUBLIC SAFETY 
Public Safety expenditures, assuming the methodology above, and utilizing the 1999 Public 
Safety expenditure of $2.25mm, it was estimated that the marginal increase in Public Safety 
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expenditure is or will be $485k from 1995 to 2009. For greater detail see Table C.9 - Multi-year 
Public Safety Expenditure Projections in Appendix C. 
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS 
The estimated marginal expenditures for Streets and Highways were estimated with a 1999 
annual expenditure of $2.74mm to derive an expenditure of $591k over 15 years. For greater 
detail see Table CIO-Multi-year Streets and Highway Expenditure Projections in Appendix C. 
PARKS AND RECREATION 
The estimated marginal expenditures for Parks and Recreation were estimated using actual 
O&M expenses each year excluding impact fee related capital projects and user fee related 
O&M. These amounts were then proportioned according to the additional population the 
occurred from Overlake per year compared to the overall population of the City. This resulted 
in an expenditure of $1.04mm over 15 years. For greater detail see Table C.ll - Multi-year Parks 
and Recreations Expenditure Projections in Appendix C 
CAPITAL PROJECTS 
The City provided at least seven specific capital project improvements to the Project or which 
benefited the Project in some way which were subsidized in full by the City. These include the 
acquisition, use or funding of Culinary Water Rights at $3.82mm7 a Culinary Distribution Water 
Main Line at $312k, the Secondary Water Reuse System Related to Amendment #4 to the 
Development Agreement at $4.71mm, proportionate 5;hare of the Secondary Water System at 
$354k, one-half of Sewer Interceptor A at $681 k, 1000 North Improvements at $834k, and 
ongoing Advanced Treatment for the Secondary System in order to water the golf course at 
$104,200 per year. In total, these capital projects equate to $11.5. For greater detail see Table 
C12 - Multi-year Capital Project Expenditure Projections in Appendix C. 
In summary, the direct financial expenditure impact from the development of the Project over 
15 years is $14mm. With direct revenue at $4mm this equates to a net loss to the City for 
allowing the Project at approximately $10mm. See Table 2.3 below as well as Table B.l -
Summary and B.2 - Summary - Multi-year Cash Flow in Appendix B for greater detail. 
TABLE 2.3 - EXPENDITURE Si 
REVENUE TYPE 
General Government 
Public Safety -
Public Works 
Parks & Recreation 
Capital Projects 
Total Expenditure 
Total Revenue 
JMMA 
IT 
$ 
$ 
LRY & REVENUES VS. EXPENDITURES 
TOTAL 
356,835 
484,919 
591,142 
1,041,272 
11,532,078 
14,006,247^ 
4,001,363^ 
Revenue minus Expenditure. j $ (10,004,884) 
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APPENDIX A, B, & C - ECONOMIC BENEFIT ANALYSIS RELATED TO 
ANNEXATION AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
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Table A.1 - S u m m a r y of E c o n o m i c Benefit to Tooe le Assoc ia tes 
Period 1995-2009 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTALS NPV 
[ M A R K E T V A L U E E N H A N C E M E N T -"Based on C'ompTSales 
Methodology 
1 Increased Value of Overlake Project Area Related to Annexation 1 
I Market Value Increase Resulting from Annexation/Development Approval2 
j Total Increase to Market Value Related to Annexation/Development Approval 
MARKET VALUE ENHANCEMENT: Based on Pro Forma Project 
[Income 
CASH RECEIPTS 
Lot Sates 
J Multi-Family 
I Commercial 
J Institutional 
Pa/ks 
I Sales Costs (4%; 
NET CASH RECEIPTS 
CASH DISBURSEMENTS 
J Development Costs 
j Administrative 
I Marketing 
1 Financing 
j Contingency (10% of Development Costs) 
I Debt Reduction 
TOTAL CASH DISBURSEMENTS 
I NET CASH FLOW3 
M A R K E T V A L U E E N H A N C E M E N T : Based on Benefit/(Costs) of 
{Annexation & Development Agreements 
• Culinary Water System 
J Water Rights4 
j Total Cuinary Water System Benefits^ Costs) I 
|Sanitary Sewer System j 
1 Dedication of 30 acres for WWTP j 
1 Dedication of 75 acres for Storage Lakes s 
1 Proportional Benefit to Overlake related to Advance Treatment (OAM Costs)* 
1 Proportional Benefit to Overlake related to Storage Ponds r 
1 Proportional Benefit to Overtake related to Interceptor A ' 
Proportional Benefit to Overlake Related to me WWTP * 
Total Sanitary Sewer System Benefits/! Costs) 
[ Total Development Agreement Benefits/(Costs) _ j 
4,200,000 
36,283,000 
1 4.200,000 . - 36,283.000 
8,600,000 
560,000 
I 59,000 
(369,000) 
8,850 000 
7,076,000 
600.000 
120,000 
1,200,000 
707,600 
9,703,600 
(853,600^ 
622 297 2,293,508 
2,293.508 
(31,050) 
(77,625) 
24,892 
24,892 
2,318.400 
9,800.000 
560,000 
59,000 
(417,000) 
10,002,000 
7,076,000 
690,000 
240.000 
720,000 
707,600 
500,000 
9,933600 
68,400 
2,692,705 
2,692,705 
116.532 
681,250 
797,882 
3,490.587 
11,000.000 
560 000 
2,178,000 
125,000 
59,000 
(557,000; 
13,365,000 
7.076.000 
794,000 
360.000 
600,000 
707,600 
3,500,000 
13.037.600 
327.400 
3,519,216 
3,519 216 
224.340 
224,340 
3,743.557 
12,000,000 
640,000 
2,178,000 
125,000 
59 000 
1600,000) 
14,402,000 
7,076,000 
913,000 
360,000 
480,000 
707,600 
4,000,000 
13,536,600 
865,400 
3,211,942 
3,211.942 
365,109 
3,191,400 
10,866.235 
14,422,744 
17,634,686 
13,000,000 
1,280,000 
5,227,000 
125,000 
59,000 
(788,000) 
18,903,000 
7.076,000 
1,049,000 
1,200.000 
480.000 
707,600 
1,000.000 
11,512,600 
7,390,400 
4,624,593 
4.624,593 
493,587 
493.587 
5.118.180 
. 
19,500,000 
1.280,000 
5.227.000 
125.000 
59.000 
(1.048,000) 
25.143.000 
10,614,000 
1.207,000 
1.200.000 
480,000 
1,061.400 
14.562.400 
10.580.600 
4.417.104 
4.417.104 
678,570 
678.570 
5,095,675 
21.000,000 
1.280.000 
5,227,000 
125,000 
59,000 
(1,108,000) 
26.583,000 
10,614,000 
1,207,000 
1.200,000 
480,000 
1.061,400 
14,562,400 
12,020,600 
3,820,100 
3,820.100 
855,255 
855255 
4,675,355 
22.500,000 
640.000 
5.227,000 
125,000 
59.000 
(1,142,000) 
27,409,000 
10,514,000 
1.207,000 
1,200.000 
480,000 
1.061,400 
14 562,400 
12.846,600 
3,781.696 
3,781,696 
1.008,059 
1.008,059 
4,789,755 
34,688.000 
720.000 
5,227,000 
125,000 
59,000 
(1633,000) 
39.186.000 
16,363,000 
1.207.000 
360.000 
480.000 
1.636,300 
20,046,300 
19.139,700 
3.426.836 
3,426,838 
1,159,326 
-
1,159.326 
4,586,165 
34,688.000 
720.000 
3,485,000 
125,000 
59,000 
11,563,000) 
37.514,000 
16,363,000 
1.207.000 
360,000 
430.000 
1,636,300 
20,046,300 
17.467,700 
-
1.296,400 
1,296.400 
1,296.400 
34,688,000 
720.000 
871.000 
125.000 
59,000 
(1.458,000) 
35 005,000 
16.363.000 
1.207,000 
360,000 
480,000 
1,636,300 
20,046,300 
14,958,700 
. 
-
1,296,400 
-
1,296,400 
1,296,400 
. 
28,613,000 
720.000 
871.000 
125,000 
59,000 
(1.215.000) 
29.173,000 
16,115.000 
1.207,000 
360.000 
480,000 
1,611,500 
19,773,500 
9,399,500 
1.296,400 
1,296,400 
1,296,400 j 
4,200,000 
36,283,000 
I 40,483,000 
I 250,077,000 
9.680,000 
35.718,000 
1,250,000 
708,000 
J 11,898,000] 
285.535,000 
132.426,000 
12.495,000 
7,320,000 
6,840,000 
13,242,500 
9,000 000 
181.323 600 
104.211.400 
32.410.000 
31.787,703 
55.341jS58j 
3,853.211 
33,287,156 
29,557,003 1 
130,229 084 
5,658.102 
23,461,671 
802,207 
422,483 
(6,270.058) 
154.303,489 
71,501.5141 
7,021.088 1 
4,184,559 1 
4,392.364 
7,150,151 1 
7,201.7551 
101,451.4311 
38,304,344 1 
__27J33J ,1 I5 | 
1
 Fair market value lo-property n Tooele County .n 1994 was approximately $3,000 per acre, compared to $5,000 per acre in Tooele City, according to Tooele Associate's December 1994 Repcrt. Thisli.Te ilem applies the $2,000 benefit to aO 2.100 acres of property which 
were outside the Tooele City bouncories (Deposition Exhibit 11B). In the Tooele Associates Sales Proposal, dated 1995-1996. the asking price for bulk-sale consideration was $9,750 per acre (Deposition Exhibit 10$). This also enhances the idea that annexation 
provided significant benelil lo Tooele Associates. 
1
 John Tooele LLC sold '.38.5 acres ol land lor $16,°00/acre on 1/15/98 according to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, between Perry & Associates Inc. and John Tooele Associates. This 136.5 acres was originally pu-chased on July 17, 1996 lor approx'malely $400k 
(»2.8867acre) according to August 17. 1996 Letter from Drew Hall to Rebecca Kar.ison (Deposition Exhibit 8J0). 8ased on an adoitional Real Estale Purchase Contract, dated September 2000. one-hundred acres were sold lor $1,800,000 or J18.C00 per sere, suggesting 
an additional $2,000 per acre ol increased value. Thjs, this line ileni applies frie enhanced value due to annexation and development approval ($18,000 - 55 000 • $13,000) lo all 2.791 acres of the Overtake Project. 
3
 Oiscounl Rate/biernaf Rale of Return of 9% is used tc determine the net present value. This is based upon Ihe Overtake Projecl Report. December 11 1997 (Deposition Exhibit 819). 
1
 Based upon Tooele Associate s buildout schedule which idenlilied the absorption of $.250 E R U s (see note 9) and a $3,500 pe< E R U water right acquisition cost (according lo a January 25, 2OO0 letter from Drew Hall to Thomas Cevore). This analysis has not attempted to 
verify the $3,500 per acre foot. 
' T h i s is an approximate amount ol acreage aleged by Tooele Associates LP. No attempt hps been node lo verify acreage amount. 
'• This line item is based upon the Porsgren ccs: estimate of $200/ acre foot related to the estimated output of effluent related to the Overlake Development (9260 ER'Js @ 70% discharge multiplied by $2O0/acre (t.(Too»/# Atsodat*% - Overtake Development Meeting 
December 11, f 995). 
'• ' h e total cost cl the storage ponds was $3 6M of which approximately 88 65% was the proportional benefit tc Tooele Associates, based on Ihe E R U calculation in footnote 8 below. 
• This l/ne item represents 1/2 of the tola! costs related to Interceptor A, It was determined that Overlake imposed approtimajey £0% ol the demand on Interceptor A 
v
 In accordance with the selected W W T P option KtentiHed n Ihe North Too»le County Factflies Planning Study, dated January 12, 1996 (TabJe 5-3). the total cost ol the WWTP was S12.257.456 04 tor a total W W T P capacity ol 2 3 5 M G D . The 12/11/1997 Tooele 
Associate's Report identified approximately 7.500 S F O U , 2.400 MFDU and 115 acres of commercial. This development plan equates to approximately 5.260 equivalent residential units (ERU's). Based on 225 gallons per day lor each 6 P U . the total benefit to Tooele 
Associates is 2 053MGD or 88.65% ol the total capacity ol Ihe WWTP. Therefore the analysis applies 83.65% ($10.86€M) ol the total cost lo Overtake. 
| CASH FLOW DISCOUNT ASSUMPTION: 
IDiscount Rate/Internal Rate of Return 
SUMMARY OF VALUE 
VALUE ENHANCEMENT: Comp. Sales Approach 80.00% 29.557,003 
VALUE ENHANCEMENT: Income Approach 10.00% 38.304.348 
VALUE ENHANCEMENT: Cost Approach 10.00% 27,333,185 
Weighted Average Market Value Enhancement Created 
by Annexation & Devebpment Agreements 100.00% 30,209,356 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Cost/Benefit Analysis 
Table B.1 - Summary 
[Property Tax 
Sales Tax 
Electric Sales & Use Tax 
Natural Gas Sales & Use Tax 
[Telecom License Tax 
[Total Revenue 
$ 
$ 
1,251,110] 
1,224,657 
537,055 
818,006 
170,534 
4,001,363 I 
[Expenditure 
[General Government 
Public Safety 
[Streets and Highways 
[Parks & Recreation 
[Capital Projects 
iTotal Expenditure 
[Revenue minus Expenditure 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Total I 
356,835 
484,919 
591,142 
1,041,272 
11,532,078 
14,006,247 I 
(10,004,884)| 
City Cost Benefit Summary; 
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TOOELE ASSOCIATES L P . vs. TOOELE CITY, UTAH 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
Table B.2 - Summary - Multi-year Cash Flow 
[Revenue 
Property fax 
Sales Tax 
Electric Sales & Use Tax 
Natural Gas Sales 4 Use Tax 
Telecom License Tax 
[Total Revenue 
$ - $ 
$ - $ 
$ - $ 
$ $ 
29 315 $ 
. 
9 917 
6.247 
-
45,478 $ 
54.355 $ 
18,222 
12.093 
84,669 $ 
68 232 $ 
4.257 
26.476 
18.317 
117,283 $ 
93,762 $ 
55.235 
37,637 
25,282 
211,916 $ 
114.516 $ 
116,491 
45,704 
30,597 
307,308 $ 
130,319 $ 
139,292 
49,023 
35,361 
353,954 S 
136.141 $ 
142.659 
51,792 
42,325 
372,917 $ 
142,181 $ 
146,108 
56,556 
54,011 
31,394 
430,249 $ 
128,858 $ 
149,640 
58,683 
69.757 
33.999 
440,977 % 
117.811 $ 
153.257 
60,109 
97,809 
32,128 
46U14 $ 
117,811 $ 
156.962 
61,011 
153,401 
34,811 
523,996 $ 
117.811 
160,756 
61,926 
272.766 
38.202 
651,461 
$ 
S 
S 
$ $ 
5 
1.251.110 
1,224,657 
537.055 
818.0G6 
170.534 
4,001,363 1 
[Expenditure 
[General Government 
Public Safety 
Streets and Highways 
Parks & Recreation 
Capital Projects 
fTota) Expenditure 
|Revenue m/nus Expenditure 
$ - $ 
-
-
5 . $ 
$ • $ 
$ - $ 
. 
J - % 
$ • * 
4.765 $ 
7,010 
8.545 
17 876 
312,233 
350,429 $ 
(304,950) % 
9.106 $ 
13395 
16..330 
35802 
681,250 
755,882 $ 
(671,21.3) % 
15 076 $ 
19.976 
24.352 
50,839 
23.454 
133,696 $ 
(16,413) $ 
29.205 $ 
30 128 
36,728 
75.649 
8.179.741 
6.351,451 $ 
i M 39,5351..$ 
28,580 $ 
38,729 
47,213 
75.768 
104.200 
294,451 $ 
12,818 $ 
29,620 S 
43,571 
53.116 
89.481 
104,200 
319,988 % 
34,006 $ 
36,367 $ 
45.804 
57,056 
104,593 
104.200 
349,020 % 
23,897 % 
40.590 $ 
52.442 
63,929 
112.482 
104,200 
373,643 $ 
56.606 5 
37,716 $ 44,471 $ 
55,481 57.731 
67,634 70.377 
116.546 116.878 
104,200 1,606,001 
381,578 $ 1,895,457 $ 
59,399 $ {11.434,3431 S 
40,195 $ 
59.128 
72.080 
120.773 
104,200 
396.375 $ 
127,621 % 
41,144 
60,524 
73,782 
124,587 
104 200 
404,238 
Total 
S 356,835 
$ 484.919 
$ 591,142 
$ 1,041.272 
$ 11,532,078 
% 14,006,2471 
247,22411 (30,004,864)1 
JBevenufrii^^^ 
Note 1: City property tax rate is held constant as the assessed valuation of property is held constant This is due to the certified rate calculation methodology as outlined in the Code 
Multi-Year Summary; Preomd By: Lewis Young Robertson Burningham. Inc. 
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TOOELE ASSOCIATES L.P. vs. TOOELE CITY, UTAH 
Table C.1 - Actual Build-out Summary 
[Commfchil Development 
[Highway Commercial 
•Retail Commercial 
[Neighborhood Commercial' 
I Commercial Development 
iHighway Comnercial 
Retail Commercial 
[Neighborhood Commercial 
Commercial Development 
[Highway Commercial 
Retail Commercial 
I Neighborhood Commercial 
Residential Development 
SFDU (Detached) 
j SFD J (Attached) 
MFDU 
Neighborhood MFDU 
i_ Mixed MFDU 
Acres 
13.0 
3.5 
0.6 
SF 
113,169 
30,056 
4,635 
Business 
26 
14 
3 
Units 
708 164 
0.6 
4J35 
3 
133 123 
6.5 
56,584 
13 
108 
5.5 
1,0 
56,584 
6,712 
13 
4 
45 
2.5 
21,344 
10 
17 
. 
31 60 19 
I 
. 
6 
[Co7nmerdal,D«VB)op ment - Average Land Vajue/Acre 
[Highway Commercial 
Retail Commercial 
Neighborhood Commercial 
[Commercial Development -Average Cost/SF 
[Highway Commercial 
Retail Commercial 
1 Neighborhood Commercial 
|UDOT Construction Inflation index ^1987 Base Year) 
Residential Develop men*-Average Sales Price 
SFDU (Oetachedj 
I SFDU (Attached) 
MRDU 
Neighborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFDU 
90,000 
90.000 
90,000 
90,000 
90,000 
16,000 
16,000 
16,000 
S««Note2' 
63 
63 
63 
146 
95,000 
95.000 
95.000 
95.000 
95,000 
16.842 
16,842 
16,842 
62 
62 
62 
143 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
17 684 
17,684 
17,664 
57 
57 
57 
132 
105,000 
105,000 
105,000 
105,000 
105,000 
18,526 
18.526 
18,526 
65 
65 
66 
153 
110,000 
110,000 
110,000 
110,000 
110,000 
19,368 
19,368 
19,368 
66 
66 
66 
153 
115 000 
115,000 
115.000 
115000 
115,000 
20,261 
20,261 
20,261 
55 
55 
55 
127 
120,300 
120,300 
120,300 
'20,300 
120.300 
21,035 
21,036 
21,036 
66 
66 
66 
153 
124,900 
124,900 
124,900 
124,900 
124,900 
22.653 
22,653 
22,653 
113 
113 
113 
260 
134,500 
134,500 
134,500 
134,500 
134,500 
25,947 
26,947 
26,947 
127 
127 
127 
294 
160.000 
160 000 
160.000 
150.000 
160 000 
32,000 
32,000 
32,000 
109 
109 
109 
252 
190.030 
190 000 
190.000 
190,000 
190.000 
30316 
30,316 
30 316 
130 
130 
130 
300 
180.000 
180,000 
180,000 
180,000 
180,000 
32.000 | 
32.000 
32.000 
135 
135 
135 | 
190,000 
190,000 
190,000 
190,000 
190,000 J 
Average Residential Appreciation 19.0% 18.8% 
• • • • • E B E S B 1 
1995 
I FAR Sales/SF* [Highway Commercial 0.20 154 
iRelaif Commercial 0.20 154 
(Neighborhood Commercial 0.20 154 
Acres to SF 43,560 
2006 
Sales/SF' 
200 
200 
200 
Bus/Acre 1 
' 2 
4 
6 
Mote 1 2006 Figure mfbtcd/delUted at 3%. Dolars I Ctnu o! S l o p i n g Cwten/Tht SCOffE ?C05; Urban Land Institute. Table t-S 
Nole 2 Tooele Associates IA5/98 purchase contract • mltated at home appreciation rate 
Note 3: Tooele Asstjoaies Buibout Schedule - Augvtl V. 1997 • C'fy Counal/PI»nnirvj Commission Wa'k Session Booklet 
Note 4 Morgan and 5wifl 7rZ0D8 BSrnate Kr Ketai eu'Wng (JiOCVsrj lor she*, trrant rvpiovsmtnts assumed at C O M 
Hole 5 Wasatch Front Regional MuJbpk lifting 5e . "v« i 2003-2008 Average Home Price* 
Nole S 'Over lap Estates Phase U (6 Lots Zcne P) Amended Final Plat April 18 2001 (buttout over 2001 »2002J 
Note 7 Overtake Estates Phase 1F [2 Lots Zone P) final put. Ap.il 30. 2001 (buikto.it over 2002 i 2I03J 
Ktote 8: Amended Plat lor Lots 601 and 624 o ' Overtake Estates Phase 1G Zone P : May 5 .1»» l (SgiWmZOCO! 
Not* 9. Deflated at 2.4t7%vrfi«h represents the 2007 S ^ e « CPI t i n 
Note 10: Estimated by City using 3 pe^scrs per houset-ofci 
Estimated Buildout 
Tooele Qvertafce Economic A n a l y s i s ^ 5.08 
Prepared by: lewte Young Robertson Bumingham, Inc 
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Cost/Benefit Analysis 
Table C.2 - Property Value Schedule 
lAtsessed Value of Proj< ;ct 
jHighway Commercial 
1 Land 
1 Personal Property 
1 Total Highway Commercial 
1 Retail Commercial 
1 Building 
I Land 
1 Personal Property 
[Total Retaii Commercial 
1 Neighborhood Commercial 
1 Building 
1 Land 
1 Personal Property 
[total Neighborhood Commercial 
[Total Commeral Vatoe 
i R f t r t f t n t f f l & f t ^ * * ^ ^ 
I SFDU (Detached) 
SFDU (Attached) 
MRDU 
1 Neighborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFDU 
j Total Residential 
[ Acres or 
Units 
— 
3 
1 
S • $ • S * S - $ - $ - $ 3,376,394 S 6.752,787 $ '.: H 
. . . . . . 120.328 246.126 . '••"• ' 
. . . . . . 675.279 1.350,557 :.. . . : . ; ; 
5 • $ . ' $ - 5 « $ • $ • $ 4,172,001 5 8,349,471 5 71 5 5 8" •! i- 1 $ •£?»,< 1 * S.349.-.1/1 
$ . $ - 5 - S - 5 • S . S . 5 577,606 $ • •• "l 
. . . . . . . 19.368 
115,521 . . . .'••:•• o i : 
712,495 .• ,S 2, ., V I 939 ?.:i?.U19 
$ - $ - 5 - 5 - 5 • $ - $ - $ 577,606 $ . - • • : . 
9.815 9,815 9,815 
115,521 .. . . . . iby.J • 
: » - : • 9J115 9,815 702,942 1 2 4,746 2 746 2^ 11 6 2t1<4,746| 
1 : : : : : *ffl~. Tmw UWW r~™ r. . . : i sw.iw T " M « ir~M« tww&i 
mmmmmmm «a* mmmmm mmmm mmmmrn mmsmm « W J M S § mmm®m. mMmem® m^»m%& mmmmm wmm%$m mmmsm timm-mm mmmm. mmamtmA 
708 
708 
$ $ - $ - $ 8,569,000 $ 15,884,000 $ 22,987,250 $ 29521,250 $ 32,367,500 $ 33492,305 $ 35,621,850.5 40,060.350 $ 41,732,350 5 42,568,350 $ 42,568,350 S 42.568,3501 
5 . $ . 5 . $ 8.569,000 i f5,mo<M) j 2*987.250 $ 23321,250 5 32,367,500 $ 33,492,305.5 35,621,850 5 4O;060,35O 5 41,732,350 $ 42,568,350 $ 42;5W,350 5 42,568,3501 
R ! W f n ^ ^ • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ » ^ M B ^^ H M Wl-J •• ^»l W i r W I I ' l B ^ f H J I r f l ' l l l B ^ I F I d l H I I l B ^ I M P f f l ' l J B ^ 1 Fll 1H MF • • ^ 1W M W J1 • • ^ > W11H I'l • • ^ f • IJ'rt I'l •• ^  1B i'J fl k-l •• ^  • If l-l Ff I'l • • ^ 1WIM W l'l • 
| I 
[ASSUMPTIONS: 
[Market Value to Assessed Value Ratio' 90% 
Personal Property as percentage of BWg. 20.00% 
Deprecation Rate of Private Property ine depreciation w/ 30% salvage - 7 year cycle 
[Residential Assessable Ratio 55.00% 
Property Values: 
Tooele Overtake Economic AnatyslsJT. 15.08 
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Table C.3: Incremental Property Tax Revenue Increase 
By Taxing Entity 
Property Tax Generation Analysis 
(Assessed Property Values 
1 Highway Commercial 
1 Retail Commercial 
1 Neighborhood Commercial 
SFDU (Detached) 
SFDU (Attached) 
MFDU 
Neighborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFDU 
|Total Assessed Property Value 
1995 Assessed Value 
[Incremental Assessed Value | 
[Taxing Entfty Property Tax Rate1 
I Tooele City 
[Total Tax Rate for Area 
[ I r icmwi ta i Property Tax Generation 
I Tooele City 
[incremental Property Tax Generation 
Ac res or Units 
13 
3 
1 
708 
1995 1995 
' Yea- 1 Yei-2 
-
-
-
0.003984 
0.003984 
$ - $ . $ 
-
•S3? 
Yc..v3 
-
-
-
0.003689 
0.003689 
- $ 
-
1993 
" Y e a r 4 ' 
8.569.000 
8,569,000 
8,569,000 
0.003421 
M03421 
29,315 
29,315 
19S9 
Ycar5 
15,884,000 
15,884,000 
-15.8Mi 
0.003422 
0,003422 
$ 54,355 
54,355 
2000 
Yc?r 6 
9,815 
22,987,250 
22,997,065 
22.997,065 
0.002967 
0.002967 
$ 68,232 
68,232
 j 
2001 
Ytof 7 
4,172,001 
9,815 
29,521,250 
33,703,065 
-33,703,065 
0.002782 
0,002782 
$ 93,752 
93,762 
20-32 
Year 8 
8,349,471 
712,495 
702,942 
32.367,500 
42,132.407 
-42,132,407 
0.002718 
0.002718 
$ 114.516 . 
114,516 
2003 
Yca rS 
8,349,471 
2,173,939 
2,114,746 
33,492,305 
46,130,460 
-45,130,460 
0.002825 
0.002825 
5 130,319 5 
130,319 
2004 
" Y e a r 10 
8,349,471 
2.173.939 
2,114 746 
35,621,850 
48,260,005 
4^,260,005 
0.002821 
0.002821 
{ 136,141 , 
136,141 
2005 
Year 11 
8,349,471 
2,173,939 
2,114,746 
40,060,350 
52.698,505 
-52,698,505 
0.GC2698 
0.002698 
5 142,181 , 
142,181 
2006 
Year 12 
8,349,471 
2.173,939 
2,114,746 
41,732,350 
54,370,505 
54,370,505 
0.002370 
0.002370 
& 128.858 
128,858 
2007 
Yea 13 
8,349,471 
2,173.939 
2,114,746 
42,568,350 
55,206,505 
-55,206,505 
0.002134 
0.002134 
I 117,811 S 
•117,811 
2DPS 
8,349,471 
2,173,939 
2,114,746 
42.568.350 
55,206,505 
-55.206.505 
0.002134 • 
0.002134 
117,811 $ 
117.811 
200? 
Yc-3r1i "'" 
8,349,471 
2,173,939 
2,114.746 
42,568,350 
55,206.505 
55,206,505 
0.002134 
0.002134 • 
117,811 
117,811 | 
Total I 
5 1,251,110 
1,251,110 
Property Tax Increment 
T o o e l e Over take E c o n o m i c Analy«s_7.15.Q8 
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Table C.4: Multi-year Sales Tax Increment Forecast 
By Taxing Entity 
[ $afcs.T«x. Ravgnues .< •:;,& •aasKS^^j^aa^tJ&r^ ' -\S Jjat13ffm5Fl [ASS(/MPT10NS: 
|SaJes Inflation Rate (5 yea/ CP1 average) TTm 
Sales Ta* Generation Analysis 
JDirect Sales (estimated) 
1 Highway Commercial 6 
Retail Commercial 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 8 
Total Direct Sales -AllPhases 
[Sales Tax Generation 
| Tooele City 
Tooele County 
State of Utah 
lilllllllHIHIIIIII'll — 
• • • • 
[ Acres 
13 
3 
1 
17 
Tax Rait' 
0.50% 
(125% 
4.75% 
1235 1995 1997 193B 193? 2300 
851,461 
• i - | ' • | - | - | 951.481 | 
4,257 
2,129 
40,445 
2001 
10,174,916 
872,065 
11.0-
55,235 
27,617 
524732 
2032 I 
20,806,177 
1,598,967 
893,146 
116,491 
58,246 
1,106,669 
2C03 
21,309,153 
5.634,445 
914,738 
27859.335 
139,292 
69,646 
1.323.271 
1
 20« | 
HESSBXI 
21,824,288 
5.770,654 
936,851 
33.S31.ird2 | 
142,659 
71,329 
1,355,260 
2035 
22,351,876 
5,910,155 
959,499 
23.221.529 
146,108 
73,054 
1,388.023 
I 2006 20 J? 2M3 
B3SB9HES9B9iHBSSQIil 
22,892.217 23,445,622 24,012,404 
6.053.029 6.199,357 6,349,223 
982.694 1.006.450 1,030,780 
29.927.941 | 33.651,42? j 31.392.437 | 
149,640 153,257 156,962 
74,820 76,629 78.481 
1,421.577 1.455,943 1,491,139 
24,592.888 
6.502711 
1.055.698 
32.15^.2?? 
160,756 
80,378 
1.527,187 
Total 
191.409,542 
44.018.541 
9,503.4011 
24i.931.4S4 
•„ Total 1 
1.224,657 
612.329 
11.634,245 | 
13,471.232 
Sales Tax Increment: 
Tooele Overtake Economic Analysis. / . 15.08 
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Table C . 5 - Multi-year Electric Energy Sales and U s e Tax Projections 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
Highway Commercial 6 
Retail Commercial 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 8 
SR3U (Detached) 
SFCU (Attached) 
MFDU 
Neiahborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFDU 
Total Electric Expenditures 
Energy Sale* & Use Tax Generation 
| Highway Comme/c'al 5 
Retail CommerciaJ 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 8 
SFDU (Detached) 
SFCU (Attached) 
MFDU 
Neighborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFDU 
Total FJectric Expenditures 
113,169 
30,056 
4,835 
708 
113.169 
30 056 
4.835 
708 
I 5 1.05 $ - $ 
1.05 
1.05 
951 
643 
553 
553 
553 
S - $ 
$ - s 
$ . $ 
. $ . $ 
- $ - $ 
$ . $ 
$ . s 
$ 
165,279 
- $ 
. $ 
9,917 
9,917 J 
$ 
303,692 
$ 
• $ 
18.222 
18,222 J 
5 
5,557 
435,715 
* 
$ 
333 
26,143 
26,478 $ 
65,932 5 
5,641 
555,714 
-
- J 
3,956 $ 
338 
33,343 
37,637 $ 
133,748 $ 
10,289 
5.725 
611568 
- 5 
8.C25 $ 
617 
344 
36.718 
45,704 $ 
135,754 $ 
35.989 
5,811 
639,492 
- $ 
3,145 $ 
2.159 
349 
38,370 
49,023 % 
137 790 $ 
36.529 
5,899 
682,979 
• 5 
8,267 $ 
2.192 
354 
40,979 
51,792 $ 
139.857 $ 
37,077 
5,987 
759.66-
- $ 
8.39' $ 
2,225 
359 
45,58' 
55,55* $ 
141,955 $ 
37,633 
6,077 
792,392 
$ 
6,517 $ 
2.258 
365 
47,544 
56,683 $ 
144,085 $ 
38,197 
6,168 
813.367 
- 5 
8.645 $ 
2.292 
370 
48,802 
60,109 * 
146,245 S 
38,770 
6,260 
825,558 
. $ 
8,775 S 
2.326 
375 
49,534 
61,011 $ 
145439 
39,352 
5.354 
837.951 
• 
8.905 
2.361 
381 
50,277 
61.926J 
$ 3 
$ $ J 
5 
$ $ $ 
Total 
71.628 
16.430 
3,569 
445,428 
5J7.M5 
|EJe<tric:.Enw5y/Safe» & J&fwJ&^-ihi'Z:- 5$ffi5?l ASSUMPTIONS: 
ntialion Rale. 
jCity Energy Sales & Use Tax Rate: 
Note 1: Represents he amounl of money spent per square tool ot commerciai or per hojsing unit per year in 1995. Data from the US Energy Information Administration 
Note 2. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics as found in Trends m Telephone Service Feb 2007, Table 12.1 
Electric Fmoehiae Tax: 
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Table C.8 - Multi-year Natural Gas Sales and Use Tax Projections 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
Natural Gas Energy Sales & t'se Tax Analyses 
1 Highway Commercial 6 
1 Retail Commercial 7 
1 Neighborhood Commercial 8 
1 SFDU (Detached) 
I SPOt'(Attached) 
J MFDU 
I Neighborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFOU 
[Total.Natural Gas Expenditure 
[Energy Saks & Use Tax Generation 
[ Highway Commercial 6 
Retail Commercial 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 8 
SFDU (Detached) 
SFDU (Attached) 
MFDU 
Neighborhood MFOU 
Mixed MFDU 
[Total EJectrlc Expenditures 
113,169 
30.056 
4,835 
708 
113.169 
30.056 
4 835 
708 
-
-
1 $ 0.13 $ 
0.13 
I 0.13 
485 
465 
338 
338 
338 
$ 
% 
$ 
$ 
$ 
S 
i 
S 
- J 
$ 
5 
. $ . $ 
104,119 
$ - $ 
s s 
6,247 
J 6,247 $ 
- 5 
201,546 
- S 
$ 
12,093 
12,093 $ 
$ 
931 
304,348 
- $ 
$ 
56 
16,261 
18.317 t 
11,468 $ 
1433 
408.459 
- $ 
688 $ 
86 
24,508 
25.282 S 
30.574 $ 
1,854 
2.315 
475,206 
• $ 
1.834 S 
111 
139 
28,512 
30,597 $ 
51,762 $ 
7,899 
3,920 
525,767 
- % 
3,105 $ 
474 
235 
31,545 
35.381 $ 
91,619 $ 
13,979 
6,938 
592,884 
- J 
5.497 J 
639 
416 
35.573 
42,325 $ 
159,220 $ 
25,819 
12,814 
692,325 
- * 
10,153 $ 
1.549 
769 
41,540 
54.011 $ 
325.579 $ 
49,675 
24 655 
763,378 
- $ 
19.535 $ 
2,981 
1,479 
45,803 
69,797 J 
651.484 $ 
99,400 
^9,334 
829.928 
s 
39.089 $ 
5.964 
2,960 
49,796 
97.J09 ( 
1,353,784 5 
206,554 
102,516 
893,832 
- $ 
81,227 S 
12,393 
6,151 
53.630 
153.401 % 
2.917.405 
445,124 
220.921 
962,657 
-
-
175,044 
26,707 
13,255 
57,759 
ZttHb 
$ $ $ 5 
$ $ $ 
* $ 
Total 
336,174 
51,018 
25,547 
405,267 
• ti,0W 
Ol^^l^^^^^^^^S^^I ASSUMPTIONS: 
Inflation Rale-.' 
City Energy Sales 4 Use Tax Rate; 
7.70%; 
6% I 
Note 1: Represenis the amount of money spent per square (cot of commercial or pv housing unit per year in 1995. Data from the US Energy Information Adminislration 
Note 2: Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics as found in Trends in Telephon* Servfcf Feb 2007, Taole 12.1 
Netur»l Gas Frenchfce Tex: 
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Table C.7 - Multi-year Telecommunications License Tax Projections 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
Highway Commercial 6 
Retail Commercial 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 
SFDU (Detached) 
SFOU (Attached) 
MFOU 
Neighborhood MFOU 
Mixed MFOU 
Total Telecom Expenditure 
3,045 $ 
3.045 
3,045 
696 
696 
696 
696 
696 
120,993 
$ 
11,053 
18,966 
43.708 S 
12.213 
406,611 
93,254 $ 
13,642 
13,679 
447,991 
105,843 $ 
49,353 
15,525 
468,140 
121,720 $ 
56,756 
17,854 
499,975 
141,803 $ 
65,120 
20,800 
556,125 
167,328 $ 
78,022 
24,544 
580,071 
199.957 S 
93,236 
29,330 
595,426 
241,948 5 
112.816 
35.489 
604,357 
296,386 
133,200 
43.474 
613.423 
Telecommunications License Tax Generation 
Highway Commercial 6 
Retail Commercial 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 8 
SFDU (Detached) 
SFDU (Attached) 
MFDU 
Neighborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFDU 
Total Tax Generation 
26 
14 
3 
708 
S 
$ 
$ $ 
% • J 
$ 
* 
S 
$ 
S 
5 
% 
$ 
s 
$ 
$ 
- I 
$ 
$ 
• 5 
$ 
5,672 $ 
2,645 
832 
22,245 
31,394 $ 
5.693 $ 
3,'.21 
982 
23 203 
33,859 $ 
6,998 $ 
3,263 
1.027 
20,840 
32,124 * 
8.468 $ 
3.949 
1,242 
21.153 
34.811 $ 
10.374 
4.837 
1,522 
21,470 
-
34,202 
$ 5 
$ $ $ S 
$ % $ 
Total 
38.205 
'7,815 
6,604 
108,910 
170.534 
I^^mmtiniiaBorat .QceroeJii,v::'- ASSUMPTIONS: 
\|ote 1: Represents the amount of money spent per business or per housing unit per 
kJote 2. Sou-ce: 3uceau of Labor Statis:ics as found in Trends in Ttlgphy* $«rvfc» F«b 2007 Table 12.1 
Inflation Rate;2 
City Energy Sales & Us* Tax Rale 2005 • 2006: 
City Energy Sales & Use Tax Rale 2007 - 2009: 
_L'nesper Business 
in 1995, Data from the Federal Communication Commission 
1.50% 
4.0% 
3.5%| 
5.00 
Tttocom Fr»n«his» Tax; 
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Table C.8 - Multi-year Genera l Government Expenditure Projections 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
[Highway Commercial 5 113.169 
Retail Commercial 7 30,055 
1 Neighborhood Commercial 8 4,835 
ISPDU (Detached) 708 
SFDU (Allachea) 
MFOU 
Neighborhood MFDU 
Muted M"DU 
SubtoUl 
[Disproportionate Level of Administrative Services 
[Paul Hansen - Engineering Cosls 
Bruce Parter • Planning Costs 1 
Subtotal 
Total 
1 8.349,471 $ 
2,173,939 
2,114,746 
42,568,350 
$ 55J06,505 $ 
$ $ 
$ 
J 
1 
* 
3 
\ 
S 
$ 
• $ 
• % 
$ $ 
$ 
4,765 
4,765 $ 
- $ A.TtS $ 
S 
9,106 
9,106 $ 
J 
9,106 1 
• $ 
6 
13,574 
13,580 $ 
1,496 
1.496 % 
15,076 $ 
2,535 S 
6 
17.940 
-
20.481 S 
3,128 
5,596 
8.724 $ 
29,205 S 
5.213 5 
445 
439 
20,226 
26.328 $ 
815 
1.435 
2,252 $ 
28,560 % 
5 351 $ 
1.396 
1.358 
21,505 
29.620 5 
• $ 
29,620 i 
5,505 $ 
1,433 
1.394 
23,485 
31,817 $ 
4,550 
<550 I 
36,367 % 
5.646 $ 
•,471 
1.431 
27,100 
35,650 $ 
4.940 
4,940 J 
40,590 $ 
5,792 $ 
1,508 
1,467 
28,949 
37.716 $ 
• % 37,716 1 
5,936 $ 
1.545 
1,503 
30,261 
39,246 % 
5,225 
5,225 $ 
*M71 J 
6,079 5 
1,583 
1.540 
30,993 
40,195 $ 
- * 40.155 $ 
5,223 
1.620 
1.576 
31,725 
41,144 
-41,144 
r 
i 
% $ 
48.296 
11,001 
10.720 
259,631 
329,645 I 
20.155 1 
7,032 1 
27,187 
359,92$ I 
l^i f ir^GcvgroirwHtg^^ S- 35$, &&J ASSUMPTIONS: 
Inflation Rale; 
1999 Estimated Market Value.1 
1999 Annual Expenditure: 
Expenditure/S of Property Value: 
Variable to Fixed Cost Ratio. 
3.00%| 
$666,295,034j 
S1.527.S1ll 
$ 0.0023 
25% 
Note 1: Represents the assessed value without the 45% resd?ntial reduction. 
Ger*er*l Gov, 
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Table C.9 - Multi-year Public Safety Expenditure Projections 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
Public Safety Expenditure Analysis (O&M Only) 
[Highway Commercial 6 
Retail Commercial 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 8 
SFDU (Detached) 
S R X J (Attached) 
•M.=DU 
Neighborhood MFDU 
.Mixed MFDU 
Totals 
113,169 
3C.056 
4,835 
708 
-
$ 8,349,471 $ 
2.173.939 
2,114,746 
42,558,350 
$ 55,206,505 $ 
$ 
S 
$ 
* 
$ $ 
7 010 
$ 7t010 % 
5 
13 395 
13.395 $ 
$ 
9 
19.967 
19,976 S 
3,729 $ 
9 
26,390 
30,128 % 
" 6 7 5 $ 
655 
645 
29,753 
38.729 $ 
7,886 $ 
2,053 
1,997 
31,634 
-
43,571 $ 
8.098 S 
2,108 
2,051 
34.547 
j 4 6 J 0 4 _ $ 
3,309 3 
2163 
2.104 
39.665 
52,442 1 
8.520 $ 
2.218 
2,158 
42,585 
55-441 ..*..._ 
8,731 $ 
2,273 
2,211 
44,515 
57.731 $ 
8,942 $ 
2.326 
2,265 
45,592 
59,128 | 
9.154 
2,383 
2,318 
46.669 
6p;524 
$ 71,045 
16,183 
15.769 
381.922 
J 4 H 9 1 9 | 
l ^ d b i i c S a f e y & c p p r ^ l i i n ^ "W® [ASSUMPTIONS: 
flnfiaiion ftate: 
1999 Estimated Market Value' ' 
1999 Annual Expenditure: 
Expenditure/? of Property Value 
[Variable to Fixed Cost Ratio: 
3.00% 
$666,285 034 
52.247,583 
$ 0.0034 
25%] 
Nate 1: Represent the assessed vak/e without the 45% residential reducton. 
Public 3»f«ty; 
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T a b l e C . 1 0 - Mu l t i - yea r S t ree t s a n d H i g h w a y s E x p e n d i t u r e P r o j e c t i o n s 
C o s t / B e n e f i t A n a l y s i s 
HI 
l Highway Commercial 6 
Retail Com.nercial 7 
Neighborhood Commercial 8 
SFDU (Detached) 
SFDU (Attached) 
MFDU 
(Neighborhood MFDU 
Mixed MFDU 
[Totals 
113,169 
30,056 
4,835 
708 
-
S 6,349,471 $ $ 
2,173,939 
2.1*4,746 
42,568,350 
* 55,206,505 $ _ _ $ 
S $ - $ 
8,545 
$ . $ 8545 5 
$ 
16,330 
16,330 % 
$ 
10 
24,341 
24,352 $ 
4,546 $ 
11 
32.171 
36,728 * 
9,356 $ 
798 
788 
36,271 
47.213 $ 
9,614 5 
2,503 
2,435 
38,564 
53,116 J 
9,871 S 
2,570 
2,500 
42,115 
57,056 S 
10,129 $ 
2,537 
2,565 
48,598 
63.923 * 
10.386 $ 
2,704 
2,631 
51.913 
_.,ttp«M — 
10,644 $ 
2,771 
2,696 
54,266 
_ 70.J77 $ 
10 901 $ 
2,838 
2,761 
55,579 
__7?,MO
 rf_ 
11,159 
2,905 
2,826 
56,892 
73,742 
$ 86.607 
19728 
19223 
465,583 
..».. »LM?I 
| s S * W & , H S t w a V » f f i f e ^ ASSUMPTIONS: 
Inflation Rale; 
fl999 Estimated Market Value:1 
1999 Annual Expenditure: 
'Expenditure/* of Properly Value 
h/ariable lo Fixed Cost Ratio: 
3.00%} 
$666,285,034] 
52.739.927j 
$ 0.0041 
25%| 
Note 1: Represents the as$essed value without the 45% residential reduction. 
St'etts & Highways. 
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Table C.11 - Multi-year Parks and Recreation Expenditure Projections 
Cost/Benefit Analysis 
wmmmmm 
J F D U (Detached) 
5FDU (Attached) 
AfDU 
Jeighborhood MFDU 
-lixed MFDU 
"oUts 
"otal City-wide O&M Park and Recreation Costs ' 
'otal City-wide Population Estimate 7 
708 2.124 
$ 2,124 $ - J 
17,875 
• $ . $ W.B76 $ 
641,955.85 
17,669 
35.802 
35,802 $ 
832,275.79 
20,713 
50 839 
50,839 
889.754.45 
22,052 
75,649 
$ 75,649 
1,109,037.97 
23,222 
75,768 
$ 75,768 
1,144,456.62 
25,965 
89,481 
$ 89,441 
1,367,588.04 
27,052 
104.593 
$ 104,593 
1,502,871.80 
26,769 
112,482 
* 112.482 
1,518,040.51 
27,572 
116,546 
$ 116,546 
1,612,892.24 
29,062 
116,876 
$ 116,878 
1,650,819.84 
30,000 
120,773 
$ 120,773 
1,705,830.06 
30,000 
124,587 
$ 124,587 
1,759,699.65 
30,000 
1.041.272 1 
5 1,041.272 
>artari R^^Expgndttur*•'. 'JK?'%Z.i -HH 7^21 NOTES: 
N o t e l ^ c l u a l C;ty-wde C&M costs excluding iser rates and impacnee^20o8aod2009 figures estmated utilizing a depressed 
inear-fegression model. 
Note 2: Estimates provided by City 
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Tabfe C .12 - Mult i -year C a p i t a l Project a n d A s s o c i a t e d Expendi tures Project ions 
Cost /Benef i t A n a l y s i s 
[Culinary Water Rights 
Culinary Distribution Main Line 
Secondary Water Reuse System Related to 
Amendment #4 to Development Agreement 
Implementation of Secondary System1 
Sewer Interceptor A2 
Advanced Treatment of Secondary (ongoing)" 
1000 North Expansion4 
[Total $ . $ 
312,233 
• J . $ 312,233 $ 
$ 
681,250 
681,250 $ 
23,454 $ 3,474,142 
4,705,599 
21454 $ 8,179,741 $ 
104,200 
104,240 % 
104,200 
104,200 $ 
104,200 
104,200 $ 
104,200 
104,200 5 
S 
104,200 
104,200 $ 
325.000 
354,777 
104..200 
822.023 
1,606,001 ) 
104,200 
104,200 $ 
104,200 
-__!P_4f200 
> S 3,822.5961 
312,233 
4.705.599 
354,777 
681.250 
833,600 
822,023 
$ 1_1.532.07B 1 
| c f e \^4^&^M^£M^t^ &S&. 11^ 532,07^ 1 NOTES: 
[Note 1: Proportionate share of City Wide secondary water system assuming a total cost of SI,4 54,319; total ERUs at City buiW-out 
(from 2008 Sewer Master Plan by Aqua Engineering) of 37,959 ERUs and Overtake potential ERUs at 9.260. 
Note 2: Proportionate share of sewer interceptor A which represents 1/2 of the total cost ($1,362,499.19', 
Note 3: Based upon S200/acre foot at 521 acre feet per year per Forsgren Report and HRO. 
Note 4: Proportionate share allocated to Overtake based upon current 708 households at 5 trips per day assuming a total tr-'p capacity 
[on 1000 North of 20,000 daily trips and a total cost of $4,644,199.41. _ 
Capital Projects; 
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ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
APPENDIX D - STATEMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
TOOELE ASSOCIATES vs. TOOELE CITY 
STATEMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ; , 
ECONOMIC BENEFIT RELATED T O A N N E X A T I O N AGREEMENT A N D DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
FOR OVERLAKE PROJECT 
July 15, 2008 
PURPOSE OF THE 
ENGAGEMENT: 
OTHER SIMILAR 
REPORTS, 
STUDIES, 
ANALYSES OR 
PUBLICATIONS: 
REMUNERATION 
OF LYRB: 
OTHER TRIAL 
EXPERIENCE, 
CASES OR 
DEPOSITIONS: 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP engaged Lewis Young Robertson & Burningham, 
Inc. (LYRB) to assist in quantifying the economic benefit received by Tooele 
Associates from an Annexation Agreement and Development Agreement 
entered into by Tooele City (City). Additionally, LYRB was asked to quantify the 
net cost/benefit of the actual development to the City. Jason W. Burningham, an 
officer and principal of LYRB, was assigned to this engagement and was 
responsible for the written report attached hereto. He was assisted by Susie 
Becker (Vice President) and Cody Deeter (Assistant Vice-President). 
Under the direction of Jason W. Burningham, LYRB has completed more than a 
dozen municipal economic cost/benefit and financial feasibility analyses and 
written reports. LYRB conducts similar cost/benefit analysis, feasibility analysis, 
and cost allocation analysis in its everyday course of business including such 
projects as: Redevelopment Agency creation, impact fee analyses, user rate 
studies, and cost of service analyses. The witness has no journal publications 
offered within the last ten years. 
As an expert witness, Jason W. Burningham on behalf of LYRB, will be 
compensated at a rate of $200.00 per hour for his consulting services and expert 
testimony related to the pending lawsuit. 
Mr. Burningham was deposed in a case involving Patterson Homes v. Town of 
Eagle Mountain in 2003 related to the imposition of impact fees as well as Larsen 
v. Mountain Regional Special Service District in 2006 for a stand-by user rate 
analysis. 
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This statement of expert witness and testimony is signed this 15th day of July 2008. 
Jason W>Burniflgham 
LEWIS YOUNG ROBERTSON & BURNINGHAM, INC. 
Principal/Owner 
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ECONOMIC BENEFIT/(COST) ANALYSIS RELATED TO ANNEXATION AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS 
JASON W. BURNINGHAM 
Principal, Lewis Young Robertson & Burningham, Inc. 
EMPLOYMENT 
Principal Lewis Young Robertson & Burningham, Inc., 1995 to Present 
Kemper Securities, Lead Analyst, 1992 to 1995 
EDUCATION 
Bachelor of Science, Finance, University of Utah, Magna CumLaude 
LICENSURE 
NASD-Series 7, 63, 8, 24 
EXPERIENCE 
SUMMARY 
I Mr. Burningham is an owner and principal of Lewis Young Robertson & Burningham, Inc. (LYRB), 
j the premier financial advisory firm located in Salt Lake City. Mr. Burningham led the initiative and 
development of creating a full-service financial consulting and advisory practice focusing on local 
| governmental entities. Mr. Burningham is the financial advisor to scores of local municipalities, 
counties and special districts. Over the past decade, Mr. Burningham has successfully coordinated 
the structuring of nearly $3.00 billion representing more than 300 transactions including genera] 
obligation, revenue, lease revenue, tax increment, and special improvement district bonds. He 
currently represents many high growth and development impacted areas throughout the State of 
Utah, including: St. George and Washington County surrounding areas, southern Davis County 
communities including: Bountiful, Centerville, North Salt Lake, Woods Cross and West Bountiful, 
northern Utah County (Lehi, Eagle Mountain, Alpine, Pleasant Grove, Lindon and American Fork), 
Mountain Regional Water Special Service District (Summit County), and Salt Lake Valley 
communities such as, South Jordan, Bluffdale, Herriman, Cottonwood Heights, Holladay City and 
| Sandy City. 
t 
j One of the primary areas of expertise of Mr. Burningham is economic and financial applications 
| related to land-use development. In particular, Mr. Burningham represents numerous local 
i governments in the areas of: i) impact fee analysis and implementation (conforming to state law 
i requirements), ii) user rate fee modeling and analysis, iii) feasibility and economic impact studies 
I and applications, and iv) capital facilities planning and financial implementation strategies. 
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Over the past year, Mr. Burningham has been intimately involved with several large land-use 
development projects, including the development / redevelopment of the St. George Municipal 
Airport, a nearly $500 million land development project (new Airport and redevelopment of nearly 
500 acres), a feasibility and financial modeling study for the Geneva Steel redevelopment plan 
(which consisted of capital facility planning, financial modeling, public / private financing analysis 
and fiscal impact on rate and tax payers), the Pleasant Grove / Lindon economic development and 
financial plan (1,000 acres of agricultural land adjacent to 1-15 interchange being developed into 
mixed-use: housing, convention center, retail, professional office space, etc.), and the Ft. Pierce 
Industrial Park development and financial plan (1,200 acres of State Institutional Trust Lands within 
Washington County being developed into a multiple tiered industrial park: public infrastructure 
j funding, redevelopment plans and tax increment funding mechanisms, and special improvement 
I district financing modeling). 
Mr. Burningham has been instrumental in working with State legislative leaders and municipal 
officials in developing legislation and statutes to better serve and govern local municipal finance, 
including the areas of impact fees, user fees, local revenue generation and municipal debt 
structuring. 
Mr. Burningham began his career with Kemper Securities, Inc. as a lead analyst of municipal 
securities. While with Kemper, Mr. Burningham was responsible for the financial structuring and 
| quantitative analysis associated with tax-exempt debt issuance. Mr. Burningham graduated magna 
cum laude with Bachelor's degree in Finance from the University of Utah (1994). He is a licensed 
General Principal and Registered Representative with the National Association of Securities Dealers 
I (NASD). 
i 
i 
i 
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